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PILOTS' USE OF A TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION-AVOIDANCE
SYSTEM (TCAS ID IN SIMULATED AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
Volume II: Appendices
SUMMARY
This report describes a study of pilots' use of and responses to a traffic alert and collision-avoidance
system (TCAS I1) in simulated air carrier line operations.
Three levels of information regarding the location of other air traffic were presented to different groups
of airline pilots current in the Boeing 727 aircraft during their execution of eight simulated air carrier
flights. Traffic conflicts were generated at intervals during the flights; where appropriate, these
conflicts were visible to the flight crews. Two of these levels represent the approaches taken by
several airlines which have installed the collision avoidance system for an in-service evaluation. In a
fourth condition, pilots flying without TCAS II equipment were exposed to the same traffic conflicts.
To ensure safe separation from conflicting aircraft, TCAS II commands a climb, a descent, or a reduc-
tion in rate of climb or descent. Aircrat_ separation was effective when the system was in use; no air-
craft came within 200 ft vertically and 1000 ft horizontally.
Average response times did not differ as a result of the amount of traffic information available.
Response accuracy, as measured by the root mean square overshoot in rate of climb or descent, also
showed no differences associated with the level of traffic information. Average peak overshoots in
response varied significantly among conditions: the mean for those crews with no traffic information
was 2272 ft/min greater than commanded rate of climb or descent, those with traffic presented only
during a conflict had a mean of 1221 ft/min, and those with continuous traffic information averaged
1317 ft/min. These momentary peak overshoot differences, however, did not result in significant
differences in the amount of altitude change.
No learning effects were observed. Differences in flight experience did not appear to contribute to the
small observed performance differences.
Pilots who had displays of conflicting traffic were observed to use the displays to maneuver to avoid
unseen traffic prior to the issuance of a resolution advisory by the TCAS II equipment.
While the results of this experiment represent only pilot response on initial exposure to this traffic alert
and collision-avoidance system under simulated conditions, they indicate that pilots are able to utilize
TCAS II effectively within the response times allocated by the TCAS II logic. They also suggest that
TCAS II, properly used, is effective in ameliorating the severity of the simulated traffic conflicts
presented in this study.
Volume II of the report contains appendices referenced in Volume I. The appendices provide details
of the experiment and the results, and contain the text of two reports written in support of the program.
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Appendix AI: TCAS EXPERI1VIENT: HANDBOOK FOR AIR CARRIERS
AND FLIGHT CREWS
Note: Appendix AI contains material sent to participating air carriers for their
information and that of flight crews designated to participate in the experiment as
subjects. Appendix A2 was sent to the carriers, who constructed flight plans and
dispatch papers in their own formats.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT RLMED
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TCAS INFORMATION TRANSFER: HANDBOOK FOR AIR CARRIER FLIGHT CREWS
Aerospace Human Factors Research Division
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035
II_rRODIJCTIOM
This handbook describes an experiment to be conducted in the NASA:Ames
Man-Vehlcle Systems Research Facility by NASA and FAA personnel. The experi-
ment is designed to evaluate the use of various Traffic Alerting and Collision
Avoidance (TCAS) information presentations by airline flight crews flying
routine short-haul high-density operations.
The information herein is published for the sole use of participating air
carriers and flight crew members, and is not to be disseminated elsewhere to
avoid compromising the design and content of the experiment scenarios.
BACXG"ROUMD
Many years of development by the FAA and its contractors have resulted in
a carefully-tested system that provides pilots in flight with data concerning
traffic conflicts. This system is called TCAS. It provides information
concerning potential conflicts as well as commands to assist flight crews to
mitigate actual conflicts. In its present form, it provides resolution advis-
ories only in the vertical mode; that is, pilots are commanded to climb or
descend when a serious conflict is detected. The flight crew is also notified
when the conflict has been resolved, in order to minimize the flight path
deviation necessary to avoid a collision.
TCAS is not designed to supplant either air traffic control's system of
separation assurance or the time-honored "see and avoid'* system of traffic
separation. Rather, it provides an independent backup to these systems, since
it makes use solely of airborne transponders as its data source.
Several display formats have been proposed to provide TCAS information in
the cockpi t . Our task is to evaluate several such presentations on a compara-
tive basis, with the hope that we shall be able to assist the aviation
community to decide upon the information elements which should be included in
the system when it becomes operational.
Our task in this experiment is to observe how flight crews respond to
other air traffic when they are given information about it in various forms.
To do this, we must observe a substantial number of flight crews flying
simulated normal missions under precisely controlled circumstances.
**: The experiment is being conducted by personnel of the NASA-Ames Research
Center's Aerospace Human Factors Research Division and the FAA's Engineering
Research and Development Office at Ames Research Center.
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APPROACH
Sixteen flight crews from various air carriers will come to Ames to
participate in this experiment. Four crews will serve as control subjects;
they will fly the routes without TCAS. The other crews will be observed while
using one of three TCAS display systems. On their first afternoon at Ames,
they will be introduced to our Boeing 727 simulator and ATC environment, then
trained in the use of the TCAS system with which they will be equipped.
All pilots will report to the Facility on the following morning and will
fly a series of eight short flights between San Francisco, Stockton, Sacra-
mento and Los Angeles (see attached schedules). The flights will be conducted
over a period of about 9-1/2 hours. They will be flown under IFR rules using
Part 121 procedures. ATC will handle the flights as normal air carrier oper-
ations, utilizing the rules provided for the conduct of such fllghts. The air
traffic control environment contains enroute and terminal sectors configured
approximately as in the actual ATC environment.
Other traffic will occur as it might in the real world. ATC controllers
will be in contact with some of this traffic; other aircraft flying with Mode
A or C transponders under VFR will not be in contact with ATC and some non-
t_ansponder traffic may not be visible to ATC.
The flight schedule resembles those found in short-haul flying. There
will be a short break half-way through the day, during which a lunch will be
provided in the pilot lounge; the simulator is also equipped with a toilet.
Coffee and soft drinks will be available on board.
Flight crews will be asked to conduct the flights as they normally would
on the line, using their normal company procedures, checklists, etc. They
will be dispatched with paperwork that resembles that which they normally use.
The flight schedules are attached; crews will be oriented to the airports and
gates they will use during their training (see below). Company radio will be
available on frequencies to be provided. Maintenance will also be available
at San Francisco and Los Angeles; maintenance facilities are not available at
Stockton or Sacramento.
AIRCRAFT
The MVSRF is equipped with a Boeing 727-232 Singer-Link simulator in
Delta Air Lines configuration. It is equipped with a Block V autopilot. The
MVSRF staff will review the airplane's equipment with each participating crew.
CONFIDE_qALITT
Experiment records will be kept in such a way that flight crew members
will not be identifiable. Though the FAA and NASA are Jointly conducting this
study, it is not in any sense an evaluation of pilot proficiency and under no
circumstances will the data be used for any purpose other than that set forth
above. The data will be lumped for reporting purposes and neither companies
nor individual flight crew members will be named in reports of the experiment.
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Flight crew subjects will receive transportation to and from San
Francisco from their employing aiT carriers. While at Ames, they will be
employed by the Bionetics Corporation, a contractor to NASA-Ames; Bionetics
will provide Workers" Compensation insurance and will cover necessary expenses
in connection with this employment. Flight crews will be provided wlth an
automobile, single accomodations at a motel near Ames Research Center, a per-
diem to cover meals and incidental expenses, and a stipend of $10.52 per hour
of time spent in the conduct of the experiment.
Flight crews will report on a Monday or Wednesday at 1400 hrs Pacific
time. They will spend the remainder of the day in training. On the following
morning, they will report at 0730 hrs for dispatch. Crews should plan to
remain in the area overnight unless they llve locally; the day will be a long
one. Unless a simulator malfunction has caused an abort, crews will be free
to leave on Wednesday or Friday morning.
FACILITY LOCATION
The Man-Vehlcle Systems Research Facility is located in Building 257 at
the NASA-Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California, at the foot of San
Francisco Bay. The facility is located within the city of Mountain View and
is easily accessible from Route 10l, the Bayshore Freeway, which passes both
San Francisco and San Jose airports. A map is attached to this package. The
Biouetics Corporation will take care of obtaining entry passes and auto decals
from Ames security personnel, and will also be available to handle any
problems that may arise.
_CPDtlHDmT STAFF
For further details, contact:
Sherry Chappell, Principal Investigator, 41S-694-6909
Barry Scott, Co-principal Investigator, 415-694-6379
Charles Billings, Senior Scientist, 415-694-5718
Ranlta Dalton, Bionetlcs, Inc., 415-694-5118
Gall Bennet-Hiley, Bionetlcs, Inc., 415-694-5118
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FLIGHT SCHEDULES - NASA/FAA TCAS EXPERIMENT
(All times are Pacific Daylight or Standard time)
Crews will be assigned to fly one of the following schedules:
FLT. BLK. L/O
FLT NO. FRM DEP: TO ARR: TIME TIME TIME RMKS
NASA-
712 SFO 0830 SCK 0902 0:20 0:32 0:13 TANKER
SCK 0815 LAX 1023 0:58 1:08 0:27
713 LAX 1050 SMF 1200 0:59 I:I0 0:15 TANKER
SMF 1215 SFO 1252 0:27 0:37 0:38
716 SFO 1330 SMF 1406 0:24 0:36 0:14 TANKER
SMF 1420 LAX 1533 1:03 I:13 0:27
715 LAX 1600 SCK 1702 0:50 I:02 0:13 TANKER
SCK 1715 SFO 1745 0:20 0:30 --
||||||BI|B||R||||||B||B||||||R||R||||||||||B|N|||RR|||B||RR||||RR|B|||R||B||||
FLT. BLK. L/O
FLT NO. FRM DEP: TO ARR: TIME TIME TIME RMKS
NASA-
715 LAX 0830 SCK 0932 0:50 i:02 0:13 TANKER
SCK 0945 SFO i015 0:20 O:30 0:25
716 SFO 1040 SMF 1116 0:24 0:36 0:14 TANKER
SRF 1130 LAX 1243 1:03 1:13 0:37
713 LAX 1320 SMF 1430 0:59 i:I0 0:15 TANKER
SMF 1445 SFO 1522 0:27 0:37 0:28
712 SFO 1550 SCK 1622 0:20 0:32 0:15 TANKER
SCK 1637 LAX 1745 0:58 1:08 --
igRR||I|BN|R|R||N|||N|||NR|||||B||B||iB||N||||nRB|||RRn||R|RB|||NR||||N||BB|BR
ELAPSED TIME: 9:15
FLIGHT TIME: 5:21
BLOCK TIME: 6:48
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INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS
LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
Bionetlcs, Inc. has a contract with American International Car Rentals to
provide automobiles at SFO and SJC. Participants must contact Bionetlcs staff
at least 24 hours before arrival to confirm arrival airport and time.
ACCOMODATIONS
Flight crews will be accomodated at the County Inn in Mountain View, CA.
The hotel is located at the Junction of the Bayshore Freeway (US Route I01)
and Moffett Boulevard. Moffett Boulevard is approximately 25 miles southeast
of SFO on Route i01, which borders SFO, and approximately 10 miles west of SJC
on the same route, which runs Just north of the airport. The rooms will be
paid for by Bionetlcs, Inc.
MEALS
There is a Denny's Restaurant, open 24 hours, adjacent to the County Inn;
a list and map of other restaurants in the area will be furnished during
training. Lunch will be furnished in the MVSRF Pilots" Lounge on the day of
the experiment. A check for per diem expenses will be provided during
training.
TRAINING
Flight crews will report to the NASA Visitors" Center, 500 feet to the
left of the main gate of Moffett Naval Air Station, by 2:00 PM on the day
preceding their experiment. The Moffett Naval Air Station is Just north of
Route 101 on Moffett Blvd. At the Visitors" Center, they wlll receive pers-
onal and auto passes good for entry throughout their stay. They will then
drive to Building N-257 in the NASA-Ames complex, where they will be met by
the project staff. An approximate training schedule is attached.
TELEPHONE NUMBERS
Project staff:
Sheryl S. Chappell, Principal Investigator
Barry Scott, Coprincipal Investigator
David Gates, MVSRF Experiment Manager
Bionetlcs, Inc., staff
Gall Bennett-Hlley
Ranlta Dalton
OFFICE
415-694-6909
415-694-6379
415-694-6737
HOME
415-854-7192
408- 252-4284
415-694-5118
415-694-5118
415-964-2518
408-298-8793
If crews are delayed in transit, they are asked to telephone any of the above
persons for instructions.
8
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EXPERIMENT SCHEDULE
First day:
1400
1410
1420
1430
1450
1500
1600
1730
1800
Arrive at NASA Visitor Center; pick up badges
Arrive at Facility; met by MVSRF staff
Fill out Bionetics and NASA forms
Begin Facility Safety Briefing
Break
Boeing 727-232 orientation and simulator flight
Begin TCAS training
Questions and answers; discussion
(approximate) Released for evening
Second day
0730
0745
0830
1300
1330
1745
1900
Arrive at Facility; met by staff; coffee
Dispatch procedures
Begin flying schedule
(approximate) Lunch in Facility
(approximate) Resume flying schedule
Complete flying schedule; debriefing; fill out questionnaires
(approximate) Released for evening
Third day
The third day will be utilized Only if equipment malfunctions
make it necessary to abort the experiment On the previous day.
Crew availability for a third day will determine whether or
not the option can be utilized.
First day will be a Monday or Wednesday as assigned by participating air car-
flees.
III:
Appendix A2: FLIGHT PLAN AND AIRCRAFT LOAD DATA
Note: Appendix A2 was sent to the air carriers, who constructed flight plans and
dispatched papers in their own formats. These data and the weather data shown
in Appendix J were used by air carriers to prepare flight plans, load sheets and
weather sheets in their own formats. The formatted data were returned to NASA
and were supplied to the experimental crews prior to flight.
F_DiNG PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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TCAS EXPERIMENT SCENARIOS: FLIGHT ROUTES
Note: These flight routes are the Center-stored flight plans for the
routes to be flown in the TCAS study.
FROM: TO:
FLT.NO. APT SID TRANS FLIGHT ROUTE ARVL APT ALT/FL
712: SFO SHOR5 ECA SCK 11000
SCK STKN5 BUSHY J1 AVE FIM FIM2 LAX FL 330
713: LAX GMN6 EHF J65 RPI WRAPS3 SMF FL 310
SMF SAC RISTI1 SFO 11000
716: SFO CUIT8 SAC SMF 10000
SMF FROG04 FRA J7 DERBB FIM2 LAX FL 330
715: LAX GMN6 EHF J65 RPI MOD SCK FL 310
SCK STKN5 CEDES SFO 11000
12
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712:SFO-SCK
TO:
SFO::OAK ECA 11000 ALT:SMF
DIST TIME ALT BURN
OAK 10/ 10
TOC 6/ 6 11000 2.1/ 2.1
TDD 2/ 8 0.3/ 2.4
ECA 50/ 60
APT 15/ 75 12/ 20 1.1/ 3.5
0:20/0:32 GS 225 0.8T 3.5B 1.OH 2.6A 7.OR 7.4F 22.3T
EMPTY _ 101700
CARGO 3100
CREW 8
FPAX 2
YPAX 50
60 10200 13300
FUEL 22300
RGW 137300
EST LGW 133000
712:SCK-LAX SCK STKN5:BUSHY J1AVE:FIM1 LAX FL330 NO ALl" REq
TO: DIST TIME ALT BURN
w--.
BI,.,:,_IY 42/ 42
TOC 22/ 22
AVE 132/174
TOD 11/ 33
FIM g4/268
SMO 35/303
APT 20/323 25/ 58
0:58/1:08 GS 334
FL330 6.3/6.3
1.7/8.0
1.6/ 9.8
B_w_gmo_m_m_
O.8T 9.8B 7.OR 17.6T
EMPTY WT
CARGO
CREW 8
FPAX 3
YPAX 92
103
FUEL
101700
14750
17510 32260
18OOO
RGW
EST LGW
151960
141760
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713:LAX-SMF LAX CMN6:EHF J65 RPI WRAPS3 SMF FL310 NO ALT RE_
TO:. DIST TIME ALT BURN
GMN 60/ 60
EHF 42/102
TOG 27/ 27 FL350 7.7/ 7.7
RPI 91/193
TOD 8/ 35 1.3/ 9.0
SAC 126/319
SMF 28/347 24/ 59 1.3/10.3
0:59/1:10 GS 353 0.8T 10.3B 7.OR 5.9F 24.0T
EMPTY WT
CARGO 1615O
CREW 8
FPAX 6
YPAX121
135 22950
FUEL
101700
39100
24000
RGW 164800
EST LGW 154000
713:SMF-SFO SMF SAC:RISTI1SFO 11000 NO ALT REq
TO: DIST TIME ALT BURN
SAC 15/ 15
TOG 5/ 5 11000 2.0/ 2.0
CEDES 55/ 70
TOD 10/ 15 1.7/ 3.7
SFO 36/106 12/ 27 1.0/ 4.7
0:27/0:37 GS 236 0.8T 4.7B 7.OR 12.5T
EMPTY WT
CARGO 6700
CREW 8
FPAX 13
YPAX129
150 25500
FUEL
101700
32200
13000
RGW
EST LGW
146900
141900
14
I:|I
716:SFO-SMF SFO CUIT8:SAC SMF 11000 NO ALT REq
TO: DIST TIME ALT BURN
REBAS 20/ 20
TOC 4/ 4 11000 2.0/ 2.0
TOD 7/ 11 1.0/ 3.0
SAC 50/ 70
SMF 28/ 98 13/ 24 1.2/ 4.2
0:27/0:37 GS 245 O.ST 4.2B 7.OR 10.5F 22.5T
EMPTY WT 101700
CARGO 6250
CREW 8
FPAX 2
YPAX 77
87 14790 21040
FUEL 22500
RGW
EST LOW
716:SMF-LAX
TO: DIST
145240
140540
,, m
SMF FROGO4:FRA J7 DERBB:FIM2 LAX FL330 NO ALT REq
TIME ALT BURN
FROCO 65/ 65
TOC 15/ 15
FRA 73/138
DERBB 111/249
TOD 24/ 39
FIM 65/314
LAX 65/379 24/ 63
FL330 4.8/ 4.8
3.2/ 8.0
1.7/ 9.7
1:03/1:13 OS 361 0.8T 9.7B 7.OR 17.5T
EMPTY _ 101700
CARGO 14250
CREW 8
FPAX 9
YPAX 72
89 15130 29380
FUEL 17500
ROW 148580
EST LGW 138580
1G
715:LAX-SCK LAX GMN6:EHF J65 RPI MOD SCK FL310 ALT:SMF
TO: DIST TIME ALT BURN
GMN 6O/ 6O
TOC 16/ 16
EHF 42/102
RPI 91/193
TOD 13/ 29
ECA 94/287
APT 4/291 21/ 50
FL310 4.5/ 4.5
1.9/6.4
1.4/7.8
0:50/1:02 GS 349 0.8T 7.8B 7.OR 1.OH 3.0A 19.5T
EMPTY Wl"
CARGO 2675
CREW 8
FPAX 3
YPAX 21
32 5440
FUEL
101700
8115
19500
RGW 129315
EST LGW 121000
715:SCK-SFO SCK STKNS:CEDES SFO 10000 NO ALT REQ
TO: DIST TIME ALT BURN
TOG 5/ 5 10000 1.7/ 1.7
CEDES 4O/ 4O
TOD 4/ g 0.8/ 2.5
SFO 36/ 76 11/ 20 0.8/ 3.3
0:20/0:30 CS 228 O.8T 3.3B 7.OR 11.1T
EMPTY WT
CARGO 3190
CREW 8
FPAX 13
YPAX 18
27 4590
FUEL
101700
7780
11100
RGW
EST LGW
120580
116900
16
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Appendix B: SUBJECT FLIGHT TIME QUESTIONNAIRE
NASA/FAA TCAS INFORMATION TRANSFER EXPERIMENT
DATA FORM: To be filled out by each crew member on arrival
EXPERIMENT NUMBER (investigator will provide this)
Your age FAA Medical Certificate Class Visual restrictions?
Cockpit position: Captain First Officer Second Officer
Currently flying (aircraft, position)
Total flying time Boeing 727 flying time
Time in cockpit position Time last 90 days
Most recent P/C or P/T (month, year)
Please characterize your operational flying during the last 90 days:
Predominantly: Night Short-haul
Day Long-haul
Average flight segments/day:
Do you consider yourself a "morning person" or an "evening person"?
17
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Appendix C: TCAS EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The TCAS experiment utilized a counterbalanced pseudo-random complete blocks design. There
were four experimental conditions in which the amount of information made available to subjects
regarding potentially conflicting air traffic was varied. Condition 1 was a control condition.
Conditions 2, 3 and 4 provided TCAS systems. In condition 2, a minimal TCAS system without
a traffic display was used. In condition 3, a planform display of other traffic was provided on the
weather radar scope only when a conflict had been detected. In condition 4, a full-time display of
all surrounding traffic was provided.
Sixteen three-person flight crews were provided by 11 U. S. air carriers. Four flight crews were
studied under each of the four experimental conditions. Each crew was studied only once, under
one of the four conditions.
Each crew flew the same eight flight scenarios in one of two orders (Vol. I, table 3). Half of the
flights were conducted under twilight conditions, half under night conditions; this variable was
counterbalanced across crews and experimental conditions. Twilight/night ambient illumination
was varied to simulate the presence or absence of a visible horizon. It is easier to evaluate the
relative vertical motion of a target aircraft if a horizon is present.
Half the crews flew each block of four flights during the morning, the other half during the after-
noon, in an attempt to counterbalance for the possible effects of fatigue. Fatigue effects, however,
and possible learning effects as the crews became more familiar with TCAS, were confounded in
this design.
First officers and Captains flew alternate legs; equal numbers of Captains and First Officers acted
as flying pilot for each flight scenario, to evaluate the probability of detecting targets when each
was flying or non-flying pilot.
Eight flight scenarios were constructed for this experiment. The weather, ATC instructions and
all events presented to subjects were scenario-dependent (i.e. a particular target, ATC situation
or malfunction was always presented in conjunction with the same specific flight leg).
Each scenario was implemented in three documents: software instructions in the SEL computer
which drove the 727 simulator and the Image II visual system, software instructions in the
VAX11/750 simulator which drove the ATC simulator and TCAS logic, and a written script used
by the air traffic controllers and keyboard aircraft pilots (Appendix K).
PRECEDING PAGE BLAr;K NOT RLMED
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EXPERIMENT MATRIX
Flight crew 1
Flight crew 2
Flight crew 3
Flight crew 4
First leg
Captain
F/O
Captain
F/O
TCAS I TCAS 2 TCAS 3 TCAS 4
1111 2111 3111 4111
1221 2221 3221 4221
1312 2312 3312 4312
1422 2422 3422 4422
Four-digit identifiers identify each unique experiment:
Where i -- TCAS Condition
j = Crew number
k -- Flight sequence
1 -_ light conditions
(1-4)
(1-4)
(1 -----SFO-SFO, 2 = LAX-LAX)
(1 = twilight/night, 2 = reverse)
2O
Appendix DI: TCAS TRAINING NARRATIVE FOR CONDITION 2
TCAS H WITHOUT TRAFFIC DISPLAY
After many years of engineering and development, the FAA, avionics manufacturers, and air-
lines are ready to operationally test the Traffic-Alert and Collision Avoidance System or
TCAS. As part of this evaluation, NASA and the FAA have joined in this study of the pilots'
use of information concerning traffic conflicts and evasive maneuvers.
The TCAS is a backup to the current air traffic control system and the see-and-avoid prac-
tice. It is an independent, airborne system that is only activated when these methods of
separation have failed.
The TCAS system continually interrogates the transponders of nearby aircraft. The TCAS
computer uses this information to predict their flight paths. If an aircraft is deemed a potential
threat by TCAS, you will be advised of its presence approximately 40 seconds before the system
projects a conflict. At 20 to 25 seconds before closest approach, you will be told how to take
evasive action, if necessary. If the other aircraft also has TCAS, the maneuvers will be coordi-
nated.
Because of current system limitations, only vertical maneuvers are used and these maneuvers
can only provide separation from altitude reporting (mode C) aircraft. TCAS will only provide
a traffic advisory for aircraft equipped with non altitude reporting transponders (mode A).
TCAS does not work at all for airplanes without transponders.
In summary, TCAS tells you two things: first, it cautions you that you may be getting too
close to an aircraft and second, it advises you what to do, if anything, to resolve a traffic
conflict.
Now let's examine the TCAS displays and their associated alerts and warnings, and do so in the
order that they will appear to you in the cockpit.
When TCAS determines that within the next 40 seconds an aircraft could come too close to you,
you will hear a tone and at the same time see an amber caution light under the glareshield.
These precursors can be cancelled by you and are designed to draw your attention out of the
cockpit to search for traffc This is the most common form of TCAS alert, the traffic advisory.
As TCAS continues to monitor the traffic it may become either less threatening, or more
threatening.
In seven out of eight cases the traffic will become less threatening. When this happens the
caution light & tone will stop (if you haven't already cancelled them).
If the "intruder" continues to be a threat, you will get another light and aural warning at 20-25
seconds from the time of closest approach. This will occur very rarely. More about these alerts
later.
Now let's review the series of events which occurs as TCAS first elects to announce threatening
traffic.
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* First the tone and the light.
* Our attention is drawn out of the cockpit, scanning for the threat traffic.
The traffic advisory is meant to be an aid, not a replacement for the "see and avoid" practice.
Remember, only aircraft with transponders will be detected by TCAS.
Should you receive a traffic advisory and this collision threat continue to develop, the IVSI will
provide you with a recommended course of action which you may use to resolve the impending
conflict.
These IVSI's appear, on initial examination, to be very similar to the conventional ones which
they replace. However, they have a series of lighted amber segments around the outer edge of
the instrument which correspond to the vertical rates depicted on the basic IVSI. Since TCAS, in
it's present form, will provide conflict resolution only in the vertical plane, these lights serve as
an ideal means of depicting what that vertical maneuver should be. The operational procedure to
be used when performing evasive maneuvers annunciated on the IVSI is simply, "Keep the nee-
dle out of the lights".
When a TCAS traffic advisory persists in being a threat, two situations can occur: traffic will
pass safely if you continue as you are, or you will have to take evasive action. In the first case
your vertical speed is OK, the needle is out of the lights.
In the second, you have to climb or descend to get the needle out of the lights.
Half the time TCAS will issue the advisory which requires no action from the pilot, other than
recognition of what the system is telling you not to do. You may be flying level, and that will
keep you clear of the traffic, but if you were thinking of starting a descent, don't do so now.
Because this type of advisory requires no change in aircraft flight path, it is presented with less
urgency. This preventative advisory is a caution. A tone will sound with an amber caution
light. Look at the IVSI lights for the area you are not to fly into. The basic ground rule for the
use of TCAS still applies; keep the IVSI needle out of the lights.
When action is required, a warning siren and light get your attention and a voice states the same
message depicted on the IVSI.
You will hear the following commands annunciated over a speaker in the cockpit and you will
see these lights on your IVSI. You should respond promptly, by smoothly maneuvering your air-
craft in order to get your vertical rate needle 'tout of the lights".
* siren, "climb, climb" Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000 foot per
minute rate of climb. TCAS evasive maneuvers are predicated on a 2000 foot per minute rate.
It is not necessary to exceed this. In fact if you climb at a rate greater than 2000 feet per
minute, this could cause you to go into another aircraft's airspace.
* siren, "descend, descend" Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000
foot per minute rate of descent, no less or no more.
* siren, "adjust vertical speed n Again, keep the vertical rate needle out of the lights. A
special case of this command is in an encounter with two aircraft where one is above and one is
below. The only safe, unlighted part is + 250 feet per minute, showing you to fly level.
* siren, "descend to cross a You will hear this advisory when you have to cross through the
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intruder's altitude for avoidance. If the intruder is climbing at a high rate but still below you,
as you can see in this diagram, your best avoidance strategy is to maneuver towards the
intruder's present position. In these situations where you must cross through the traffic's alti-
tude, you will hear "descend to cross" or "climb to cross".
* In extremely rare situations, when the TCAS logic cannot resolve the conflict, you will
hear "unable to command", and at the same time all the lights on the IVSI will flash on
and off. When you get this message, you must resolve the conflict yourself using all available
information. This could occur, for example, if the intruder aircraft were to maneuver making a
previously issued solution inappropriate, (as in this diagram) or if you have maneuvered
differently than TCAS prescribed.
* You will be surprised how little displacement is required to provide separation, 300 feet is
the average. The command for evasive action will disappear very quickly. The lights on the
IVSI will go out and you will hear the message "clear of conflict". Promptly and smoothly
return to your assigned altitude or flight profile. Safe use of TCAS depends on you minimiz-
ing how far you have deviated from your clearance.
Since the evasive action required by TCAS to resolve most conflicts is small in distance and
duration, most of these maneuvers will be of little consequence to ATC. However, you may wish
to notify ATC that a situation occurred requiring you to maneuver based on a TCAS advisory,
when time and cockpit work load permit.
One other note regarding the use of the IVSI: if you are descending or climbing at a rate that
is greater than 2000 feet per minute and TCAS decides you should continue doing what you are
doing, the arcs in the IVSI will only light up to reflect a maximum rate of 2000 feet per minute.
Maintain your present rate, until you no longer have the climb or descend lights. This trait of
the current system is due to a limitation within the IVSI display and eventually will be
corrected.
Now that you have had a chance to review the correct responses to TCAS, let's watch a typical
encounter and review the appropriate crew procedures used in dealing with it.
TCAS detectsa potentialthreatand cautionsthe crew.
The Pilot Flying, in this case the captain, immediately begins a visual search for the intruder.
The Pilot Flying also may cancel the light on the glareshield.
The Pilot Not Flying states "Traffic" as an acknowledgment and will then join the pilot flying
in the visual search for the intruder.
Should the intruder continue to pose a threat and evasive action become necessary, BOTH
pilots will clear the airspace into which the maneuver will take them while the Pilot Flying
promptly, and smoothly, complies with the TCAS by getting the needle out of the lights.
When the words "Clear of conflict" are heard the Pilot Not Flying will state "Clear" and the
Pilot Flying will, as smoothly and expeditiously as practical, return the aircraft to its previously
assigned flight path.
The second officer will assist in looking for traffic, monitor the situation and advise of any
discrepancies.
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Let's review then the basic ground rules regarding the use of TCAS and its displays.
1. The traffic advisory is intended to be used as an al.d to visual acquisition, and to prepare
the crew mentally and physically for possible evasive action. If you have established visual con-
tact with the threat traffic, you may maneuver your aircraft without being told to do so by
TCAS. However, this greatly reduces the accuracy of TCAS to predict the separation. The
maneuver logic provides ample time to obtain separation once conditions require it.
2. Prior to taking the evasive action displayed on the IVSI, CLEAR THE AIRSPACE INTO
WHICH YOU ARE GOING TO MANEUVER.
3. TCAS evasive maneuvers shall be complied with in a TIMELY AND GENTLE FASHION.
4. Proper response to resolutions displayed on the IVSI will be to KEEP THE RATE NEEDLE
OUT OF THE LIGHTS.
5. If your vertical speed needle is already out of the lights, MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT
RATE, rather than reduce to 2000 feet per minute.
6. Remember to always MINIMIZE YOUR DEVIATION FROM ATC CLEARANCE
7. Once the threathas been resolvedand you hear nClear of conflictn PROMPTLY AND
SMOOTHLY RETURN TO YOUR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED FLIGHT PATH.
8. COMPLIANCE WITH A TCAS MANEUVER IS EXPECTED, UNLESS, IN THE JUDGE-
MENT OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND, DOING SO WOULD PRESENT A GREATER
HAZARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLIGHT.
9. And finally, although TCAS is an extremely useful tool for insuring aircraft separation, it
will only detect aircraft with operating transponders, and will only resolve conflicts with
those that also have accurate altitude information. It is therefore still somewhat limited in
its' capabilities and SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL CREW
VIGILANCE OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT.
TCAS represents the results of years of research and development by government and industry.
It has been developed for your use. Now your help is needed to evaluate the system in an opera-
tional environment. Even though this evaluation is in a simulator, please conduct this flight
as you normally would. With your help in the implementation of TCAS, the high level of
safety which currently exists in our Air Transport System will be even further enhanced.
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Appendix D2: TCAS TRAINING NARRATIVE FOR CONDITION 3
TCAS II WITH TRAFFIC DISPLAY ONLY DURING CONFLICTS
After many years of engineering and development, the FAA, avionics manufacturers, and air-
lines are ready to operationally test the Traffic-Alert and Collision Avoidance System or
TCAS. As part of this evaluation, NASA and the FAA have joined in this study of the pilots'
use of information concerning traffic conflicts and evasive maneuvers.
The TCAS is a backup to the current air traffic control system and the see-and-avoid prac-
tice. It is an independent, airborne system that is only activated when these methods of
separation have failed.
The TCAS system continually interrogates the transponders of nearby aircraft. The TCAS
computer uses this information to predict their flight paths. If an aircraft is deemed a potential
threat by TCAS, you will be advised of its presence approximately 40 seconds before the system
projects a conflict. At 20 to 25 seconds before closest approach, you will be told how to take
evasive action, if necessary. If the other aircraft also has TCAS, the maneuvers will be coordi-
nated.
Because Of current system limitations, only vertical maneuvers are used and these maneuvers
can only provide separation from altitude reporting (mode C) aircraft. TCAS will only provide
a traffic advisory for aircraft equipped with non altitude reporting transponders (mode A).
TCAS does not work at all/or airplanes without transponders.
In summary, TCAS tells you two things: first, it cautions you that you may be getting too
close to an aircraft and second, it advises you what to do, if anything, to resolve a traffic
conflict.
Now let's examine the TCAS displays and their associated alerts and warnings, and do so in the
order that they will appear to you in the cockpit.
When TCAS determines that within the next 40 seconds an aircraft could come too close to you,
you will hear a tone and at the same time see an amber caution light under the glareshield.
These precursors can be cancelled by you and are designed to draw your attention to the traffic
advisory display which constitutes one of two primary TCAS displays. The CRT which
currently provides weather radar information now takes on this additional function and will
now show the most common form of TCAS alert, the traffic advisory. It will come to life when
TCAS predicts an aircraft could come too close to you. The information displayed on the CRT
is designed to help establish visual contact with the threat traffic and includes:
* A chevron in the lower center of the CRT represents your aircraft.
* A circle with a 2 mile radius is made up of asterisks at each o'clock position.
* The range between your aircraft symbol and the edge of the display is 6 miles in front, 4
miles either side, and approximately 3 miles behind.
* And, since the CRT will only come to life when TCAS has something it wants to show you,
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an amber triangle will appear at the "intruder's" relative position to you. This triangle
accompanied by additional information about this airplane.
That information is in the form of a data block consisting of three or four symbols as follows:
is
* A plus sign indicating that the traffic is above you or a minus sign indicating the traffic is
below you.
* A two digit number indicating the number of feet, in one hundred foot increments, that the
aircraft is above or below you. However, if the traffic's altitude is unknown, in other words,
the intruder's Mode "C" is inoperative or, the aircraft is not equipped with it, two question
marks will appear in this block instead of a number.
* If the aircraft is climbing or descending greater than 500 feet per minute, you will see an
arrow indicating the direction of movement.
All of this information is meant to provide a timely and clear reference to assist you in seeing
the other air traffic which may pose a threat to you. Although the bearing information provided
to you is accurate to about eight degrees, it is not accurate enough to be used for evasive
maneuvers. Therefore the first rule for operating TCAS is that you may not maneuver the
aircraft based solely on the information displayed on the traffic advisory display.
As TCAS continues to monitor the traffic it may become either less threatening, or more
threatening.
In seven out of eight cases the traffic will become less threatening. When this happens the
indicator will go blank and the caution light & tone will stop (if you haven't already cancelled
them).
* If the "intruder" continues to be a threat, it's color will change to red at 20 to 25 seconds
from the time of closest approach. A red target is the highest priority, and is a call for action
on the part of the pilot. They will be seen very rarely. More about "red targets" later.
Now let's review the series of events which occurs as TCAS first elects to show threatening
traffic.
* First the tone and the light.
* Our attentionisdrawn to the CRT where we see an amber triangleand itsassociateddata
block 1 mile outsidethe 2 mile range ringand about our 3 o'clockposition.The data block indi-
cates that the intruder is 600 feetbelow us and climbing at a rategreaterthan 500 feetper
minute.
Were ATC to provide us with the same advisory they would say, "Traffic 3 o'clock 3 miles
climbing through your altitude".
Also on the CRT, are two other targets shown in blue. These targetsare commonly referred
to as "proximate traffic"and are displayed,along with our primary targetof interest,ifthey
are within 4 miles and ÷ or - 1200 feetof our altitude.These aircraftare displayedto improve
our situationalawareness and aid inlocatingthreattrafficout ofthe window.
When a traffic advisory is displayed, only the three aircraft of greatest threat to you will be
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shown.
From time to time you may see two other types of symbols on your traffic advisory display.
They are:
* An amber squareused to representan aircraftwhich isoutsidethe range scaleof the CRT.
* And on the very rareoccasionthat TCAS isunable to trackthe bearing of an aircraft,due to
temporary antenna shielding,you willsee a data block in the upper leftcorner of the CRT
which gives,inthe appropriatecolorcode,the range and relativealtitudeofthe intruder.
The computer is continually sorting all aircraft which are being tracked by TCAS. Any time
you wish to observe the 8 most important aircraft which TCAS is tracking, merely push the
traffic toggle switch on the control panel. The traffic advisory display will display the top eight
aircraft of interest for fifteen seconds, even though TCAS may be tracking more than 8.
In summary, the traffic advisory display when properly used, is meant to be an aid, not a
replacement for the "see and avoid" practice. Remember, only aircraft with transponders will
be shown.
Should you receive a traffic advisory and this collision threat continue to develop, the second of
TCAS's' primary displays, the IVSI will provide you with a recommended course of action
which you may use to resolve the impending conflict.
These IVSI's appear, on initial examination, to be very similar to the conventional ones which
they replace. However, they have a series of lighted amber segments around the outer edge of
the instrument which correspond to the vertical rates depicted on the basic IVSI. Since TCAS, in
it's present form, will provide conflict resolution only in the vertical plane, these lights serve as
an ideal means of depicting what that vertical maneuver should be. The operational procedure to
be used when performing evasive maneuvers annunciated on the IVSI is simply, "Keep the nee-
dle out of the lights".
When a TCAS traffic advisory persists in being a threat, two situations can occur: traffic will
pass safely if you continue as you are, or you will have to take evasive action. In the first case
your vertical speed is OK, the needle is out of the lights.
In the second, you have to climb or descend to get the needle out of the lights.
Half the time TCAS will issue the advisory which requires no action from the pilot, other than
recognition of what the system is telling you not to do. You may be flying level, and that will
keep you clear of the traffic, but if you were thinking of starting a descent, don't do so now.
Because this type of advisory requires no change in aircraft flight path, it is presented with less
urgency. This preventative advisory is a caution. A tone will sound with an amber caution
light. Look at the IVSI lights for the area you are not to fly into. The basic ground rule for the
use of TCAS still applies; keep the IVSI needle out of the lights.
When action is required, a warning siren and light get your attention and a voice states the same
message depicted on the IVSI.
You will hear the following commands annunciated over a speaker in the cockpit and you will
see these lights on your IVSI. You should respond promptly, by smoothly maneuvering your air-
craft in order to get your vertical rate needle "out of the lights".
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* siren, "climb, climb w Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000 foot per
minute rate of climb. TCAS evasive maneuvers are predicated on a 2000 foot per minute rate.
It is not necessary to exceed this. In fact if you climb at a rate greater than 2000 feet per
minute, this could cause you to go into another aircraft's airspace.
* siren, "descend, descend s Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000
foot per minute rate of descent, no less or no more.
* siren, *adjust vertical speed n Again, keep the vertical rate needle out of the lights. A
special case of this command is in an encounter with two aircraft where one is above and one is
below. The only safe, unlighted part is % 250 feet per minute, showing you to fly level.
* siren, "descend to cross" You will hear this advisory when you have to cross through the
intruder's altitude for avoidance. If the intruder is climbing at a high rate but still below you,
as you can see in this diagram, your best avoidance strategy is to maneuver towards the
intruder's present position. In these situations where you must cross through the traffic's altl-
tude, you will hear "descend to cross" or "climb to cross".
* In extremely rare situations, when the TCAS logic cannot resolve the conflict, you will
hear "unable to command", and at the same time all the lights on the IVSI will flash on
and off. When you get this message, you must resolve the conflict yourself using all available
information. This could occur, for example, if the intruder aircraft were to maneuver making a
previously issued solution inappropriate, (as in this diagram) or if you have maneuvered
differently than TCAS prescribed.
* You will be surprised how little displacement is required to provide separation, 300 feet is
the average. The command for evasive action will disappear very quickly. The lights on the
IVSI will go out and you will hear the message "clear of conflict". Promptly and smoothly
return to your assigned altitude or flight profile. Safe use of TCAS depends on you minimiz-
ing how far you have deviated from your clearance.
Since the evasive action required by TCAS to resolve most conflicts is small in distance and
duration, most of these maneuvers will be of little consequence to ATC. However, you may wish
to notify ATC that a situation occurred requiring you to maneuver based on a TCAS advisory,
when time and cockpit work load permit.
One other note regarding the use of the IVSI: if you are descending or climbing at a rate that
is greater than 2000 feet per minute and TCAS decides you should continue doing what you are
doing, the arcs in the IVSI will only light up to reflect a maximum rate of 2000 feet per minute.
Maintain your present rate, until you no longer have the climb or descend lights. This trait of
the current system is due to a limitation within the IVSI display and eventually will be
corrected.
Now that you have had a chance to review the correct responses to TCAS, let's watch a typical
encounter and review the appropriate crew procedures used in dealing with it.
TCAS detects a potential threat and displays it to the crew.
The Pilot Flying, in this case the captain, looks at the traffic advisory display, approximates
the position of the threat aircraft, and immediately begins a visual search for the intruder. The
Pilot Flying also may cancel the light on the glareshield.
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The Pilot Not Flying states "Traffic" as an acknowledgment and will also look at the traffic
advisory display and will verbally interpret the display for the pilot flying by giving the range,
bearing, and relative altitude of the intruder.
The Pilot Not Flying will then join the pilot flying in the visual search for the intruder.
If the Pilot Flying requires an update on the position of the intruder it will be provided by the
Pilot Not Flying in order that the he can continue the visual search.
Should the intruder continue to pose a threat and evasive action become necessary, BOTH
pilots will clear the airspace into which the maneuver will take them while the Pilot Flying
promptly, and smoothly, complies with the TCAS by getting the needle out of the lights.
When the words "Clear of conflict" are heard the Pilot Not Flying will state "Clear" and the
Pilot Flying will as smoothly and expeditiously as practical, return the aircraft to its previously
assigned flight path.
The second officer will assist in looking for traffic, monitor the situation and advise of any
discrepancies.
Let's review then the basic ground rules regarding the use of TCAS and its' displays.
1. The traffic advisory display is intended to be used as an aid to visual acquisition, and to
prepare the crew mentally and physically for possible evasive action. MANEUVERS BASED
SOLELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ON THE TRAFFIC ADVISORY
DISPLAY ARE PROHIBITED. If you have established visual contact with the threat traffic,
you may maneuver your aircraft without being told to do so by TCAS. However, this greatly
reduces the accuracy of TCAS to predict the separation. The maneuver logic provides ample
time to obtain separation once conditions require it.
2. Prior to taking the evasive action displayed on the IVSI, CLEAR THE AIRSPACE INTO
WHICH YOU ARE GOING TO MANEUVER.
3. TCAS evasive maneuvers shall be complied with in a TIMELY AND GENTLE FASHION.
4. Proper response to resolutions displayed on the IVSI will be to KEEP THE RATE NEEDLE
OUT OF THE LIGHTS.
5. If your vertical speed needle is already out of the lights, MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT
RATE, rather than reduce to 2000 feet per minute.
6. Remember to always MINIMIZE YOUR DEVIATION FROM ATC CLEARANCE
7. Once the threathas been resolvedand you hear wClear of conflictn PROMPTLY AND
SMOOTHLY RETURN TO YOUR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED FLIGHT PATH.
8. COMPLIANCE WITH A TCAS MANEUVER IS EXPECTED, UNLESS, IN THE JUDGE-
MENT OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND, DOING SO WOULD PRESENT A GREATER
HAZARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLIGHT.
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9. And finally, although TCAS is an extremely useful tool for insuring aircraft separation, it
will only detect aircraft with operating transponders, and will only resolve conflicts with
those that also have accurate altitude information. It is therefore still somewhat limited in
its' capabilities and SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL CREW
VIGILANCE OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT.
TCAS representsthe resultsofyears of researchand development by government and industry.
Ithas been developed foryour use. Now your helpisneeded to evaluatethe system in an opera-
tionalenvironment. Even though this evaluation isin a simulator,pleaseconduct thisflight
as you normally would. With your help in the implementation of TCAS, the high levelof
safetywhich currentlyexistsin our Air Transport System willbe even furtherenhanced.
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Appendix D3: TCAS TRAINING NARRATIVE FOR CONDITION 4
TCAS II WITH CONTINUOUS DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC
After many years of engineering and development, the FAA, avionics manufacturers, and air-
lines are ready to operationally test the Traffic-Alert and Collision Avoidance System or
TCAS. As part of this evaluation, NASA and the FAA have joined in this study of the pilots'
use of information concerning traffic conflicts and evasive maneuvers.
The TCAS is a backup to the current air traffic control system and the see-and-avoid prac-
tice. It is an independent, airborne system that is only activated when these methods of
separation have failed.
The TCAS system continually interrogates the transponders of nearby aircraft. The TCAS
computer uses this information to predict their flight paths. If an aircraft is deemed a potential
threat by TCAS, you will be advised of its presence approximately 40 seconds before the system
projects a conflict. At 20 to 25 seconds before closest approach, you will be told how to take
evasive action, if necessary. If the other aircraft also has TCAS, the maneuvers will be coordi-
nated.
Because of current system limitations, only vertical maneuvers are used and these maneuvers
can only provide separation from altitude reporting (mode C) aircraft. TCAS will only provide
a traffic advisory for aircraft equipped with non altitude reporting transponders (mode A).
TCAS does not work at all for airplanes without transponders.
In summary, TCAS tells you two things: first, it cautions you that you may be getting too
close to an aircraft and second, it advises you what to do, if anything, to resolve a traffic
conflict.
Now let's examine the TCAS displays and their associated alerts and warnings, and do so in the
order that they will appear to you in the cockpit.
When TCAS determines that within the next 40 seconds an aircraft could come too close to you,
you will hear a tone and at the same time see an amber caution light under the glareshield.
These precursors can be cancelled by you and are designed to draw your attention to the traffic
advisory display which constitutes one of two primary TCAS displays. The CRT to the left of
your weather radar will show the most common form of TCAS alert, the traffic advisory. The
information displayed on the CRT is designed to help establish visual contact with the threat
traffic and includes:
* An aircraft symbol in the lower center of the CRT represents your aircraft.
* A circle with a 3 mile radius is made up of tick marks at each o'clock position.
* A 5 mile range ring consists of a series of dots. (These range rings correspond to the nomi-
nal IFR separations in terminal and enroute airspace, respectively.)
* The distance between your aircraft symbol and the compass arc is selected by the range
knob and is shown in the upper right corner. The heading on the compass comes from the
31
Captain's HSI.
* When an aircraft is predicted to come too close to you, a solid amber circle will appear at
the "intruder's" relative position to you. This amber circle is accompanied by additional infor-
mation about this airplane.
That information is in the form of a data block consisting of three or four symbols as follows:
* A plus sign indicating that the traffic is above you or a minus sign indicating the traffic is
below you.
* A two digit number indicating the number of feet, in one hundred foot increments, that the
aircraft is above or below you. However, if the traffic's altitude is unknown, in other words,
the intruder's Mode t'Ct' is inoperative or, the aircraft is not equipped with it, no altitude data
block will appear.
* If the aircraft is climbing or descending greater than 500 feet per minute, you will see an
arrow indicating the direction of movement.
All of this information is meant to provide a timely and clear reference to assist you in seeing
the other air traffic which may pose a threat to you. Although the bearing information provided
to you is accurate to about 3 degrees, it is not accurate enough to be used for evasive maneuvers.
Therefore the first rule for operating TCAS is that you may not maneuver your aircraft based
solely on the information displayed on the traffic advisory display.
As TCAS continues to monitor the traffic it may become either less threatening, or more
threatening.
In seven out of eight cases the traffic will become less threatening. When this happens the
caution light & tone will stop (if you haven't already cancelled them) and the solid amber circle,
at the aircraft's relative location, will become a white diamond.
* If the "intruder*' continues to be a threat, its symbol will change to a red square at 20-25
seconds from the time of closest approach. A red target is the highest priority, and is a call for
action on the part of the pilot. They will be seen very rarely. More about "red targets" later.
Now let's review the series of events which occurs as TCAS first elects to show us threatening
traffic.
* First the tone and the light.
* Our attentionisdrawn to the CRT where we see a solid amber circleand itsassociateddata
block at the 3 mile range ring and about our 3 o'clockposition.The data blockindicatesthat
the intruderis600 feetbelow us and climbing at a rategreaterthan 500 feetper minute.
Were ATC to provide us with the same advisory they would say, "Traffic 3 o'clock 3 miles
climbing through your altitude".
Also on the CRT, are two other white diamond aircraft symbols. These targets are com-
monly referred to as "proximate traffic" and are displayed, along with our primary target of
interest. If they are within 4 miles and + or - 1200 feet of our altitude they will be filled dia-
monds. If they are at a greater distance, the diamonds will not be filled. These aircraft are
displayed to improve our situational awareness and aid in locating threat traffic out of the
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window.
From time to time you may see two other types of symbols on your traffic advisory display.
They are:
* An amber arrow pointing to an aircraft which is outside the range scale of the CRT.
Selecting a higher range setting will bring the target onto the display.
* And on the very rare occasion that TCAS is unable to track the bearing of a threat aircraft,
due to temporary antenna shielding, you will see a message at the top, in the appropriate color
for the level of threat.
The computer is continually evaluating the flight paths of all the aircraft which are being
tracked by TCAS. The traffic advisory display will display any of these that are in the range
and altitude band you have selected.
The traffic advisory display control panel, located directly below the display, is used to select
the horizontal and vertical ranges at which you wish to see traffic.
The range knob provides a choice of four full scale ranges on the display - three, five, ten and
twenty miles. The altitude select switch is used to select the altitude band of interest for display.
In the normal position, all aircraft within + 2700 feet of your own altitude will be displayed.
In the "above" position, all aircraft being tracked above will be displayed in addition to the
"normal" altitude slice, that is - twenty-seven hundred feet below, to about 7000 feet above - the
limit of vertical surveillance. Likewise, in the "below" position, aircraft will be displayed within
÷ 2700 feet to -7000 feet from your altitude.
Range scales and altitude slices may be selected at pilot option. As a start, it is suggested that
10 miles be used at takeoff, 20 miles in cruise, and selectively smaller scales during descent to
landing. The selections made on the display control panel have no effect on the ability to
respond correctly to a TCAS maneuver, so experiment to see what seems most useful.
The relative altitude/flight level switch provides a means of displaying the actual flight level of
the target aircraft, rather than the normal altitude relative to your aircraft in hundreds of feet.
This switch is spring loaded to the relative altitude position and the display of flight levels will
revert to relative altitudes 15 seconds after depressing the switch.
In summary, the traffic advisory display when properly used,
replacement for the "see and avoid" practice. Remember, only
be shown.
is meant to be an aid, not a
aircraft with transponders will
Should you receive a traffic advisory and this collision threat continue to develop, the second of
TCAS's' primary displays, the IVSI will provide you with a recommended course of action
which you may use to resolve the impending conflict.
These IVSI's appear, on initial examination, to be very similar to the conventional ones which
they replace. However, they have a series of lighted amber segments around the outer edge of
the instrument which correspond to the vertical rates depicted on the basic IVSI. Since TCAS, in
it's present form, will provide conflict resolution only in the vertical plane, these lights serve as
an ideal means of depicting what that vertical maneuver should be. The operational procedure to
be used when performing evasive maneuvers annunciated on the IVSI is simply, "Keep the nee-
dle out of the lights".
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Whena TCAS traffc advisorypersistsin beinga threat, two situationscanoccur: traffic will
passsafelyif you continue as you are, or you will have to take evasive action. In the first case
your vertical speed is OK, the needle is out of the lights.
In the second, you have to climb or descend to get the needle out of the lights.
Half the time TCAS will issue the advisory which requires no action from the pilot, other than
recognition of what the system is telling you not to do. You may be flying level, and that will
keep you clear of the traffic, but if you were thinking of starting a descent, don't do so now.
Because this type of advisory requires no change in aircraft flight path, it is presented with less
urgency. This preventative advisory is a caution. A tone will sound with an amber caution
light. Look at the IVSI lights for the area you are not to fly into. The basic ground rule for the
use of TCAS still applies; keep the IVSI needle out of the lights.
When action is required, a warning siren and light get your attention and a voice states the
same message depicted on the IVSI.
You will hear the following commands annunciated over a speaker in the cockpit and you will
see these lights on your IVSI. You should respond promptly, by smoothly maneuvering your air-
craft in order to get your vertical rate needle "out of the lights".
* siren, "climb, climb w Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000 foot per
minute rate of climb. TCAS evasive maneuvers are predicated on a 2000 foot per minute rate.
It is not necessary to exceed this. In fact if you climb at a rate greater than 2000 feet per
minute, this could cause you to go into another aircraft's airspace.
* siren, ndescend, descend w Begin a quarter G maneuver in order to establish a 2000
foot per minute rate of descent, no less or no more.
* siren, "adjust vertical speed N Again, keep the vertical rate needle out of the lights. A
special case of this command is in an encounter with two aircraft where one is above and one is
below. The only safe, unlighted part is + 250 feet per minute, showing you to fly level.
* siren, "descend to cross" You will hear this advisory when you have to cross through the
intruder's altitude for avoidance. If the intruder is climbing at a high rate but still below you,
as you can see in this diagram, your best avoidance strategy is to maneuver towards the
intruder's present position. In these situations where you must cross through the traffic's alti-
tude, you will hear "descend to cross n or "climb to cross".
* In extremely rare situations, when the TCAS logic cannot resolve the conflict, you will
hear nunable to command", and at the same time all the lights on the IVSI will flash on
and off. When you get this message, you must resolve the conflict yourself using all available
information. This could occur, for example, if the intruder aircraft were to maneuver making a
previously issued solution inappropriate, (as in this diagram) or if you have maneuvered
differently than TCAS prescribed.
* You will be surprised how little displacement is required to provide separation, 300 feet is
the average. The command for evasive action will disappear very quickly. The lights on the
IVSI will go out and you will hear the message "clear of conflict". Promptly and smoothly
return to your assigned altitude or flight profile. Safe use of TCAS depends on you minimiz-
ing how far you have deviated from your clearance.
Since the evasive action required by TCAS _to resolve most conflicts is small in distance and
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duration, most of these maneuvers will be of little consequence to ATC. However, you may wish
to notify ATC that a situation occurred requiring you to maneuver based on a TCAS advisory,
when time and cockpit work load permit.
One other note regarding the use of the IVSI: if you are descending or climbing at a rate that
is greater than 2000 feet per minute and TCAS decides you should continue doing what you are
doing, the arcs in the IVSI will only light up to reflect a maximum rate of 2000 feet per minute.
Maintain your present rate, until you no longer have the climb or descend lights. This trait of
the current system is due to a limitation within the IVSI display and eventually will be
corrected.
A back up source of the information on the IVSI appears in the upper left corner of the traffic
display. This symbology consists of green arrows for climb and descend advisories, and the inter-
national "do not" symbol over white arrows to indicate that vertical speed must be limited
either up or down. Refer to the IVSI eyebrow lights to see what the limit is.
Maneuver advisories which might be triggered when intentionally flying close to another air-
craft should be inhibited. For example, when parallel visual approaches are in progress to run-
ways spaced less than 3000 feet apart, select "TA only" on the transponder mode switch. This
will prevent maneuvering advisories, being issued for planned, close separations. A tralIic
advisory may still be issued, which will call your attention to the location of the aircraft on the
other approach. The normal operating position for the transponder switch is TCAS, which pro-
vides full functioning of both the TCAS and the transponder.
Now that you have had a chance to review the correct responses to TCAS, let's watch a typical
encounter and review the appropriate crew procedures used in dealing with it.
TCAS detects a potential threat and displays it to the crew.
The Pilot Flying, in this case the captain, looks at the traffic advisory display, approximates
the position of the threat aircraft, and immediately begins a visual search for the intruder. The
Pilot Flying also may cancel the light on the glareshield.
The Pilot Not Flying states "Traffic" as an acknowledgment and will also look at the traffic
advisory display and will verbally interpret the display for the pilot flying by giving the range,
bearing, and relative altitude of the intruder.
The Pilot Not Flying will then join the pilot flying in the visual search for the intruder.
If the Pilot Flying requires an update on the position of the intruder it will be provided by the
Pilot Not Flying in order that the he can continue the visual search.
Should the intruder continue to pose a threat and evasive action become necessary, BOTH
pilots will clear the airspace into which the maneuver will take them while the Pilot Flying
promptly, and smoothly, complies with the TCAS by getting the needle out of the lights.
When the words "Clear of conflict" are heard the Pilot Not Flying will state "Clear" and the
Pilot Flying will as smoothly and expeditiously as practical, return the aircraft to its previously
assigned flight path.
The second officer will assist in looking for traffic, monitor the situation and advise of any
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discrepancies.
Let's review then the basic ground rules regarding the use of TCAS and its displays.
1. The traffic advisory display is intended to be used as an aid to visual acquisition, and to
prepare the crew mentally and physically for possible evasive action. MANEUVERS BASED
SOLELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ON THE TRAFFIC ADVISORY
DISPLAY ARE PROHIBITED. If you have established visual contact with the threat traffic,
you may maneuver your aircraft without being told to do so by TCAS. However, this greatly
reduces the accuracy of TCAS to predict the separation. The maneuver logic provides ample
time to obtain separation once conditions require it.
2. Prior to taking the evasive action displayed on the IVSI, CLEAR THE AIRSPACE INTO
WHICH YOU ARE GOING TO MANEUVER.
3. TCAS evasive maneuvers shall be complied with in a TIMELY AND GENTLE FASHION.
4. Proper response to resolutions displayed on the IVSI will be to KEEP THE RATE NEEDLE
OUT OF THE LIGHTS.
5. If your vertical speed needle is already out of the lights, MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT
RATE, rather than reduce to 2000 feet per minute.
6. Remember to always MINIMIZE YOUR DEVIATION FROM ATC CLEARANCE
7. Once the threat has been resolved and you hear "Clear of conflict" PROMPTLY AND
SMOOTHLY RETURN TO YOUR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED FLIGHT PATH.
8. COMPLIANCE WITH A TCAS MANEUVER IS EXPECTED, UNLESS, IN THE JUDGE-
MENT OF TH_ PILOT-IN-CO_ND, DOING SO WOULD PRESENT A GREATER
HAZARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLIGHT.
9. And finally, although TCAS is an extremely useful tool for insuring aircraft separation, it
will only detect aircraft with operating transponders, and will only resolve conflicts with
those that also have accurate altitude information. It is therefore still somewhat limited in
its' capabilities and SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL CREW
VIGILANCE OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT.
TCAS representsthe resultsof years of researchand development by government and industry.
Ithas been developed foryour use. Now your help isneeded to evaluatethe system inan opera-
tionalenvironment. Even though this evaluation isin a simulator,pleaseconduct thisflight
as you normally would. With your help in the implementation of TCAS, the high levelof
safetywhich currentlyexistsin our Air Transport System willbe even furtherenhanced.
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Appendix E: DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION COMPUTER INTEGRATION
The NASA-Ames ResearcllCenter Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility(MVSRF) was
used for thisstudy. The aircraftsimulatorused was a Singer-LinkBoeing 727-23223 advanced
technology simulatorwith a sixdegree-of-freedomotion system and a SingerLink-MilesImage
II three-channel,four-window dusk-nightvisualsystem. This deviceisqualifiedunder FAA part
121, Appendix H as a phase 2 simulator. The simulator isdriven by a Gould SEL 3277 com-
puter;the Image-Ifvisualsystem iscontrolledby a dedicatedspecial-purposemicro-processer.
The simulated aircraft operated in an air traffic control environment created by an air tral_c
control simulation resident in a Digital Equipment Corporation VAX11/750 computer. The
simulation has three controller workstations and three keyboard pilot work stations capable of
simulating up to 36 other aircraft. All workstations and the 727 simulator are interconnected by
voice communications using appropriate air traffic control VHF frequencies. The gaming area
simulated for this study included Oakland and Los Angeles Air Route Tramc Control Centers,
and four terminal areas: Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco and Stockton.
A word about the relationships among the computers and devices will explain how the simula-
tion was constructed.
o The VAX computer accomplished the following functions:
Creation of the ATC environment, controller screens and ATC sectors, creation of
navigational aids
Creation of simulated aircraft in space when triggered by information from the
SEL computer regarding 727 altitude or geographic coordinates, and subsequent
control of those aircraft according to prearranged instructions or on receipt of
instructions from the keyboard pilots
Creation of keyboard pilot control screens
Running the winds model; transfer to the SEL of winds at 727 altitude
Provision, via VAX-SEL link, of data regarding position and altitude of visual air-
craft (this information was subsequently transferred from the SEL computer to
the Image microprocessor for visual presentation
Provision to the TCAS logic, also resident in the VAX, of information regarding
727 and other aircraft position and altitude
Running the TCAS logic algorithms
Generation of TCAS display and alerting commands, TCAS symbols, warning sig-
nals and aural microprocessor for presentation in the cockpit
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o The SELcomputerwasresponsiblefor thefollowing:
Runningthe aircraft and motion algorithms
Creation of the Observer station screens and execution of experimenter instruc-
tions
Transfer to the VAX and Image of 727 operating parameters
Transmission to the TCAS alerting hardware of instructions from the VAX
Control of weather (except winds) and turbulence
o The Image microprocessor was responsible for
Generation and manipulation of the visual surround of the 727
Generation of visible targets in positions commanded by the VAX
Driving the four CRT's in the 727 cab
o A separate audio microprocessor controlled all communications.
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Appendix F: SUBJECT INFORMATION FORM
NASA/FAA TCAS INFORMATION TRANSFER EXPERIMENT:
SUBJECT INFORMATION
To oursubjects:
As youknow,wehaveguaranteedyou absolute confidentiality, which means that we may
not keep a record of your identity. Most of our subjects in the past, however, have asked to be
informed of the results of the research in which they participated.
This form provides a way in which we may place your name on our mailing list without
violating our pledge of confidentiality. By returning the form to us, you will be placed on our
mailing list for TCAS reports, but we will not be able to match your name with the specific
flights in which you were involved.
We are deeply grateful to you for taking part in this important study, and we hope you
will enjoy being with us.
Sheryl L. Chappell, Principal Investigator
Barry C. Scott, Co-principal Investigator
(If desired, detach and mail this part of sheet)
Please place me on the mailing list for TCAS experiment reports:
NAME (please print)
STREET ADDRESS
CITY, STATE, ZIP
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Appendix G: EXPEREVIENTER CHECKLIST AND SUBJECT BRIEFING OUTLINE
DAY 1
Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4
Administrative paperwork
mailing list form
meal selection
dispatch papers
safety briefing
workload booklet
Conditions 2, 3, 4
training film
quiz
flight manual supplement
DAY 2
Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4
workload sheets8x3
questionnaire
debrief
experiment notebook
encounterobserverforms
inop labelsforTCAS panel
Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4
1. Please conduct the flight as you would normally; you should make cabin announcements,
report out and off times, etc.
2. If you have any questions for maintenance or company operations, call them on company
radio.
3. Expect normal occurrences, for example minor equipment problems.
4. We'll let you know if there is a computer or simulator problem.
5. Alternate legs: flies first today.
6. Cockpit activity is being monitored: flight data recorder and CVR.
Conditions 2, $, 4
7. TCAS operation items have been added to your checklists.
8. Use the ground test to familiarize yourselves with the voice and lights.
9. If you have any question about the operation or interpretation of TCAS, a project pilot is
always available through company radio.
10. Failure flags and their ramifications appear in the flight manual supplement.
11. Condition 3 only: Radar STBY is for radar, not TCAS.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT RIMED
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Appendix H: QUIZ ON TCAS, USED DURING TRAINING
Note: Quiz shown is for Condition 4
Circle the letter corresponding to ALL answers which are correct.
1. TCAS will issue a traffic advisory for potential threat aircraft with:
a. altitude reporting transponders
b. transponders without altitude reporting
c. no transponder
2. TCAS will advise you of a need for evasive action for threat aircraft with:
a. no transponder
b. transponders without altitude reporting
c. altitude reporting transponders
3. When
a.
b.
you see a red TCAS warning light and hear a siren and voice command, you should:
refer to your IVSI lights which will tell you how not to maneuver
refer to your IVSI lights which will tell you how to maneuver
4. When
a.
b.
C.
you receive a tral_ic advisory, you should:
mentally and physically prepare for a possible maneuver
promptly and smoothly maneuver your aircraft away from the threat
attempt to establish visual contact with the threat aircraft
5. Order the following steps to be taken when TCAS recommends evasive action:
get the needle out of the lights
clear the airspace
-- return to your assigned altitude or flight path
6. You are climbing at 3000 fpm when the IVSI lights come on from -6000 to +1500 fpm,
you should:
a. check with ATC prior to adjusting your climb rate
b. continue climbing at your present rate
c. reduce climb rate to 1500 fpm to minimize deviation from clearance
. When the IVSI designated a climb at 1500 fpm.
climb from level flight. When the IVSI lights go out except for 0
should:
a. descend at a rate less than 1500 fpm to your previous altitude
b. level your aircraft
c. maintain 1500 fpm climb until all the lights are out and you hear
"clear of conflict", then return to your previous altitude
You promptly established a 1500 fpm
to -6000 fpm, you
Draw the following situations on the IVSI on the attached page:
PRECEDING
8. Your descent rate is 1000 fpm and TCAS tells you not to exceed 1500 fPm descent.
Is pilot action required? yes no
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9.You are climbing at 3000 fpm, TCAS tellsyou to lessenyour climb rate.
Ispilotactionrequired? yes no
I0. Your descentrateis500 fpm and TCAS tellsyou to climb to avoid traffic:
Ispilotactionrequired? yes no
11. You were leveland now you are respondingto a descend command:
12. The most important thingto remember about TCAS is:
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Circle the letter corresponding to ALL answers which are correct.
When TCAS provides a resolution on the IVSI, the conflict traffic on the traffic display
is a:
a. white diamond
b. red square
c. amber circle
A threat aircraft that is beyond the range of the display is shown as:
a. an unfilled white diamond
b. an arrow in the direction of the threat
c. an amber circle
d. a data block in the upper left corner
Rank the following traffic symbols in the order of increasing threat:
red square
unfilled white diamond
filled white diamond
ambe_ circle
The
a.
b.
C.
d.
distance between your aircraft and the inner ring of tick marks is:
3 nautical miles
selected on the display control panel
5 nautical miles
shown in the upper right corner
This altitude block -09 T indicates the traffic is
If a target has no altitude block:
a. it is outside the altitude band you have selected for display
b. it does not have an operating altitude encoder
c. it is at your altitude
d. TCAS can not issue a resolution maneuver
Does the selection of the above/below or horizontal range change the affectiveness of the
TCAS? yes no
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Appendix I: TCAS AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT
Note: Flight manual supplement shown here is for TCAS
with continuous display of traffic, experimental condition 4.
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AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT
FOR
BOEING 727
This Supplement must be attached to the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual
if the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is installed.
The information contained herein supplements or supersedes the information
of the basic Airplane Flight Manual only in those areas listed herein. For
limitations, procedures and performance information not contained in this
Supplement, consult the basic Airplane Flight Manua
TCAS Number 4
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Limitations
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
TCAS Limibations
TCAS traffic advisory displayed information is for information only and is
not to be used as a basis for maneuvering to avoid a threat aircraft,
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Norma I Procedures
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
COCKPIT PREPARATION
TRANSPONDER ............................................ STBY
ALTITUDE REPORTING .................................. 1, EMPR
TCAS ................................................... TEST
Select self-test and check for aural signals and indications on IVSI. On
the traffic advisory display you will see: a heading of north, a 20
nautical mile horizontal range, the word TEST in the lower right corner,
and each of the 4 target types, for 5 seconds. A failed self test is
indicated by the amber TEAS FAIL flag on the IVSI, and the message FAIL
preceded by the type of failure at the top of the traffic display.
NUMBER ONE FOR TAKEOFF
TRANSPONDER/TEAS
if passed TEAS self test ........................ TEAS
if failed TEAS self test ...................... XPDR 2
%
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Normal Procedures
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
TCAS TRAFFIC ADVISORY PROCEDURE
TRAFFIC DISPLAY
VISUAL SEARCH FOR TRAFFIC
MEMORY
OBSERVE PF, PNF
ACCOMPLISH ALL
ALERT
CAUTION
INDICATIONS
Tone, amber light
(cancel if desired),
amber circle at threat
location on display
PILOT RESPONSE
If threat traffic is visually
acquired, maintain visual
contact to insure separation
TCAS TRAFFIC CAUTION PROCEDURE, NO EVASIVE ACTION REQUIRED
IVSI NEEDLE OUT OF LIGHTS
VISUAL SEARCH FOR TRAFFIC
MEMORY
VERIFY PF, PNF
ACCOMPLISH ALL
ALERT
CAUTION
I INDICATIONS I PILOT RESPONSE
I I
I IVSI lights, tone, I Monitor IVSI, keep needle out
I amber Ight, red squarel of amber lights. Continue
I target on display I visual search.
1 I
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Normal Procedures
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
TCAS TRAFFIC WARNING PROCEDURE, EVASIVE ACTION REQUIRED
MEMORY
IVSI LIGHTS
VISUALLY CLEAR AIRSPACE
PITCH
IVSI NEEDLE OUT OF LIGHTS
VISUAL SEARCH FOR TRAFFIC
WHEN CLEAR, RE]URN TO FLIGHT PATH
OBSERVE PF, PNF
ACCOMPLISH PF, PNF
ADJUST PF
VERIFY PF, PNF
ACCOMPLISH ALL
ACCOMPLISH PF
ALERT
CLIMB
or
CLIMB TO
CROSS
DESCEND
or
DESCEND TO
CROSS
ADJUST
VERTICAL
SPEED
CLEAR OF
CONFLICT
UNABLE TO
COMMAND
INDICATIONS PILOT RESPONSE
IVSI lights _+2000
siren, voice "climb"
red light, red square
target on display
IVSI lights Z-2000
siren, voice
"descend", red light,
red square target
IVSI lights for
unsafe vertical rate
siren, voice "adjust
vertical speed", red
light, red target
no IVSI lights
no siren/voice/light
no red square target
IVSI lights flash
siren, voice "unable
to command" red
light, red target
Promptly and smoothly establish a
2000 fpm climb, if climb rate >2000,
maintain greater rate. Monitor IVSI
for change in lights.
Promptly and smoothly establish a
2000 fpm descent, if descent rate
>2000, maintain greater rate. Monitor
IVSI for change in lights.
Promptly and smoothly adjust pitch to
get rate needle out of lights.
Monitor IVSI for change in lights.
Promptly and smoothly adjust pitch .to
return to last assigned altitude or
flight path.
Use all available information to
resolve traffic conflicb.
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Supplementary Procedures
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
TCAS FAILURE
If TCAS operation is erratic or unsatisfactory or if the
appears and/or a failure message appears on the radar CRT:
TCAS/TRANSPONDER ................................... XPDR 2
TCAS FAIL flag
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Flight Instruments
B-727 Operations Manual Supplement
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TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TEAS)
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TEAS) utilizes aural
annunciation and warning lights to advise the pilots of threatening traffic
as well as potentially threatening traffic. A caution & warning light,
modified IVSI's and traffic advisory display serve as the system's
indicators. A TEAS control panel is located on the forward electronics
(control stand) panel.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The collision avoidance system (TEAS) will be
operated in accordance with the procedures specified in this manual. This
system only detects aircraft that are transponder equipped. Continued
traffic vigilance is still necessary even with TCAS installed.
Sxsbem Description
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TEAS) is a completely
airborne system that interrogates transponders in nearby aircraft once each
second. From these interrogations TEAS determines closure rate and
predicts altitude separation at the closest point of approach (CPA). If
TEAS computes that aircraft separation at CPA warrants notification of
the crew, a traffic advisory will be issued.
A TRAFFIC ADVISORY provides information on the display to aid
acquisition of conflicting traffic.
in visual
If the conflicting traffic continues to close and TCAS determines the
aircraft separation at CPA may cause the threat of a near-miss or possible
collision situation, the system provides a caution or warning.
A TCAS CAUTION/WARNING provides the flight crew with vertical guidance and
is displayed on the Captain's and F_rst Officer's IVSI's. If separation is
adequate, this vertical guidance will prevent the crew from initiating a
climb or descent into the traffic. If separation is not sufficient, the
warning will be guidance to alter the existing vertical flight path.
T_CAS Control and Display System
The TCAS system provides a visual display of intruder aircraft, and both
visual and audible warnings to the flight crew. The TCAS flight deck
avionics display and control is divided into five subsystems"
I. TCAS control panel
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3.
4.
5.
Note: audible cautions and
warnings are cancelled by
pressing the warning light/
switch.
Traffic advisory display
Modified IVSI's for Captain & First Officer
TCAS CAUTION/WARNING Lights
TCAS audible warning system r
I.,dARNIN_
CAUTION
TCAS CONTROL PANEL
k. )
This panel is located beside the radar CRT on the center console.
amber light is lit here green light is lit here
"--... t
r¢ct
' ' P.LTRPTG' XpDI_O _1'1' @.htl" _" FIS'srW ,,.,M
c.r_ I---/I---1! ---71--71 " \ I /'_"
_ Itlll /i tl "rA_
ONt.Y _J To_
TC_S ((" _)1 @ r_rc s
,a, ......
The function of each switch position is as follows:
STANDBY: TCAS is powered but display of information is inhibited.
XPDRI: Normal operation position for transponder and TCAS.
TCAS: Normal operation position for transponder and TCAS
{Same as XPDRI).
XPDR2: Transponder 2, no TCAS.
TCAS TEST: Initiates the internal self-test procedure of TCAS
components when transponder/TCAS in standby.
The two lights on the control panel indicate the operating status of the basic
transponder & altitude reporting; the green light (indicated in control panel figure
above) shows that the altitude reporting is not functioning; the amber light (also
indicated in the control panel figure above) indicates a transponder failure.
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The traffic advisory display provides TCAS
transponder equipped aircraft. Aircraft
follows:
information for interrogated
position data are displayed as
Own Aircraft - Represented by a aircraft symbol below center on the
screen and pointed up.
Range Ring - The own aircraft symbol is encircled by 12 tick marks, at
clock position 1 through 12. These tick marks are 3 nautical miles
from own aircraft position and can be used to estimate range of
conflicting traffic.
- A 5 mile range ring consists of a series of dots.
Intruder Aircraft - Presented by
outside the selected horizontal
pointing to the ai rcraft_s location.
information is as follows"
color coded symbols. Intruders
range are displayed as an arrow
Color/shape coding of displayed
Amber Circle - Traffic advisory information. This traffic represents
posslbie threat. Visual search should be accomplished to locate
this traffic.
Red Square - Traffic threat information. This traffic represents an
actual threat. An IVSI displayed warning will be present for aircraft
displayed in red.
White Diamond - A filled white diamond is used to represent any non-
co_ictlng transponder equipped traffic within 4 miles, and _ 1,200
feet.
- An unfilled white diamond is used to represent any non-conflicting
transponder equipped traffic within the selected horizontal and
vertical ranges.
NOTE: Occasionally TCAS may not receive bearing information on an
intruder for a short period of time. These aircraft will be
represented in a table at the top of the display.
Intruder Relative Altitude - This information is displayed as a signed two
digit number _n hundreds of feet relative to own aircraft, plus for
aircraft above and minus for aircraft below.
+05 (500 feet above)
Whenever the intruder is detected to be changing altitude at a rate of at
least 500 FPM. An arrow will appear to the right of the altitude
information to indicate a climb or descent.
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NOTE: Non-altitude reporting ah'cralt are displayed without an altitude data block.
CLIMB
(CHECK
IVSl)
075 DEGREE HEADING
+ 7000, -2700 FT.
RANGE SELECTED
5 NAUTICAL MILE
RANGE SELECTED
AIRCRAFT
CAUSING
900 FT. ABOVE,
DESCENDING
1100 FT.
BELOW & WITHIN
4 MI. & 1200 FT.
ALTITUDE
2300 FT.
BELOW & MORE THAN"
+ 1200 FT. & 4 MI.
AWAY
TRAFFIC
ADVISORY
TARGET
1200 FT. ABOVE,
DESCENDING
AIRCRAFT WITHOUT
ALTITUDE REPORTING
TRAFFIC ADVISORY DISPLA Y CONTROL PANEL
This panel is located beneath the trafficadvisory display. The function of each switch position is
u follows:
ALT FL --
This causes the altitudes of targets to appear as flight levels, rather than in hundreds of
feet relative to you. This switch is spring loaded to the relative altitude (REL} posi-
tion and the flight levels will revert to relative altitudes 15 seconds alter depressing the
switch.
RANGE--
seen.
10, and 20 nautical miles horizontal ranges may be selected at which traffic is
This number is reflected in the upper right corner of the tramc display.
ABOVE--
This switch selectsthe verticalrange of trafficto be displayed. In the ABOVE position
alltraffic7000 ft above and 2700 ft below willbe shown..
NORM--
IntheNORM position _ traffic+/-2700R willbeshown.
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BELOW
BRT
This switch selects the vertical range of traffic to be
displayed. In the BELOW posltlon all traffic 7000 ft below and
2700 ft above will be shown.
- This knob adjusts the brightness of the display,
MODIFIED IVSl's
Segment lights have been added on the edge of the instrument face. When
these lights illuminate, TCAS is advising the pilot that an aircraft
vertical rate in the area illuminated is not appropriate. These segments
are lighted to provide advisories to: climb, descend, not climb, not
descent, to remain level or to limit aircraft vertical rate to 500, 1000 or
2000 feet per minute climb or descent.
CAUTION/WARNING LIGHTS
There is a caution/warning light mounted just below the glare shield. The
light has an amber section marked "CAUTION" and a red section marked
"WARNING." Depressing the light will extinguish the light and silence the
aural warning system.
TCAS SPEAKER AND AURAL WARNING
The aural warning system provides selected aural indications (mono-tone or
European siren) and voice instructions describing the vertical maneuver
displayed on the IVSI. The TCAS speaker is mounted overhead in the
cockpit.
OPERATION
Electrical power for the TCAS system comes from the master radio bus. To
supply power to the TCAS select TCAS, XPDR 1, or STBY on the
TCAS/transponder control panel.
TCAS DESIGN FEATURES WHICH LIMIT THE TCAS OPERATING ENVELOPE OR DISPLAYS
1. TCAS resolution maneuvers are not generated for non-altitude
aircraft.
reporting
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2. TCAS does not detect non-transponder equipped aircraft.
3. TCAS maneuver indications are inhibited below 500 feet ACL.
4. TCAS maneuver indications are inhibited below 700 feet AGL when the
landing gear is down and locked and the flaps are greater than 25 degrees.
NOTE. When responding to a DESCEND advisory while in the
co--on-trniguration at tow altitude, caution should be exercised.
all TCAS advisories, visual acquisition should be attempted
crews should remain altitude aware.
landing
As with
and all
.
DESCEND advisories are inhibited below 700 feet ACL.
6. CLIMB advisories are inhibited whenever the landing gear
locked and the flaps are greater than 25 degrees.
is down and
7. TCAS receives radar altitude above ground level information
radar altimeter. If the radar altimeter is inoperative,
indicate a failure message and the TCAS should be turned OFF by
transponder 2.
from the
TCAS will
selecting
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Warning Systems
B-727 Operat;ons Manua Supplement
SYSTEM CONDITION _( WARNING
TCAS TCAS TRAFFIC ADVISORY,
POTENTIAL COLLISION THREAT
TCAS TRAFFIC CAUTION,
COLLISION THREAT, NO
MANEUVER REQUIRED
TCAS TRAFFIC WARNING,
COLLISION THREAT, EVASIVE
MANEUVER REQUIRED
AMBER CAUTION LIGHT, TONE
AMBER IVSI LIGHTS,
AMBER CAUTION LIGHT, TONE
AMBER IVSI LIGHTS, RED CAUTION
LIGHT, SIREN, AND A VOICE
MESSAGE: "CLIMB, DESCEND,
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, CLEAR OF
CONFLICT, UNABLE TO COMMAND"
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Appendix J: FORECAST AND ACTUAL WEATHER
Flight 712: SFO-SCK-LAX
WX CA-NV 1200Z-2400Z
BFL CLR 15 2512 54/46 989
FAT CLR 12 2305 52/42 989
LAX CLR 3H 2710 57/50 984 R25L OTS TO 180OZ
OAK 90 SCTD l0 2712 55/49 990
SCK -X3 BKN 1F 2210 60/59 987 R29VR5000
SFO 100 BKN 8 2615 57/49 990 R01L OTS UFN
SMF 90 BKN 4HK 2208 64/55 989
LAX CLR 5 BCMG CLR 2HK CHC IF
SCK 50 BKN 5 CHC 10 OVCST 1F 2000Z 50VCST 1F
SFO CLR 15 OCNL 50 BKN I0 2000Z 50 BKN 10 BCMG 15 OVCST 5
SMF CLR 30CNL 50 BKN 2
CA-NV: WK LO 400 SW SFO MVG NE. BLCKG HI VCT LVS WL MV SE BY 1200Z TMRW.
CLDS,WX:
CSTL CA: CLR-BKN MDL CLD, VIS 5-10 THRU PD. INT VLYS CA: MDL CLD WL
BCM LO CLDS AND FOG, CLD 05-10 BKN-OVCST VIS 2-3 OCNL BLO 1F. SO CAL:
CLR 2-5HK OCNL 1-3HK. SFC WDS 22-26 10-15 THRU PD.
NOTAMS:
LAX: R25L OTS MTNCE TO 1800Z TODAY. TRKS AND PERS ON TAXIWYS SO OF R25R.
SFO: ROIL OTS UFN DUE RESFCG.
SFO: R34 MALS OTS AFTER 0100Z TMRW. R34 GS OTS MTNCE.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT RIMED
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Flight 713: LAX-SMF-SFO
WX CA-NV 1200Z-2400Z
BFL CLR 15 2512 50/46 989
FAT 9 OVCST 4F 0000 49/46 989
LAX CLR 3H 2710 57/50 984 R25L OTS TO 1800Z
OAK 90 SCTD 10 2712 55/49 990
SCK 4 BKN ll/2F 2210 60/59 987 R29VR6000+
SFO 110 BKN 8 2515 58/50 989 R01L OTS UFN
SMF 90 BKN 6 2210 64/55 989
LAX CLR 5 BCMG CLR 2HK CHC 1F
SCK 50 BKN 5 CHC 10 OVCST 1F 2000Z 5 OVCST 1F
SFO CLR 15 OCNL 50 BKN 10 2000Z 50 BKN 10 BCMG 15 OVCST 5
SMF CLR 30CNL 50 BKN 2
CA-NV: WK LO 400 $W SFO MVG NE. BLCKG HI VCT LVS WL MV SE BY 1200Z TMRW.
CLDS,WX:
CSTL CA: CLR-BKN MDL CLD, VIS 5-10 THRU PD. INT VLYS CA: MDL CLD WL
BCM LO CLDS AND FOG, CLD 05-10 BKN-OVCST VIS 2-3 OCNL BLO IF. SO CAL:
CLR 2-SHK OCNL 1-3HK. SFC WDS 22-26 10-15 THRU PD.
NOTAMS:
LAX: R25L OTS MTNCE TO 1800Z TODAY. TRKS AND PERS ON TAXIWYS SO OF R25R.
SFO: R01L OTS UFN DUE RESFCG.
SMF: R34 MALS OTS AFTER 0100Z TMRW. R34 GS OTS MNTNCE.
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Flight 716: SFO-SMF-LAX
WX CA-NV 0000Z-1800Z
BFL CLR 15 2512 54/46 989
FAT 90VCST 2F 0000 49/46 989
LAX 250 BKN 3HK 2706 55/50 985 R25L OTS TO 1800Z
OAK 90 SCTD 10 2712 55/49 990
SCK -X3 BKN 1F 2210 60/59 987 R29VRSO00
SFO 90 BKN 12 2616 57/49 989 R01L OTS UFN
SMF 100 BKN 4HK 2212 62/55 988
LAX CLR 5 BCMG CLR 2HK CHC 1F
SCK 50 BKN 5 CHC 10 OVCST 1F 2000Z 50VCST 1F
SFO CLR 15 OCNL 50 BKN 10 2000Z 50 BKN 10 BCMG 15 OVCST 5
SMF CLR 30CNL 50 BKN 2
CA-NV: WK LO 400 SW SFO MVG NE. BLCKG HI VCT LVS WL MV SE BY 1200Z TMRW.
CLDS,WX:
CSTL CA: CLR-BKN MDL CLD, VIS 5-10 THRU PD. INT VLYS CA: MDL CLD WL
BCM LO CLDS AND FOG, CLD 05-10 BKN-OVCST VIS 2-30CNL BLO 1F. SO CAL:
CLR 2-SHK OCNL 1-3HK. SFC WDS 22-26 10-15 THRU PD.
NOTAMS:
LAX: R25L OTS MTNCE TO 1800Z TODAY. TRKS AND PERS ON TAXIWYS SO OF R25R.
SFO: R01L OTS UFN DUE RESFCG.
$MF: R34 MALS OTS AFTER 0100Z TMRW. R34 GS OTS MNTNCE.
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Flight 715: LAX-SCK-SFO
WX CA-NV O000Z-18OOZ
BFL CLR 8 2410 52/46 989
FAT 70VCST 11/2F 2105 48/46 988
LAX 300 BKN 2HK 2704 55/50 985 R25L OTS TO 1800Z
OAK 80 BKN 15 2715 55/49 990
SCK II BKN 4F 2210 62/59 988
SFO 80 BKN 15 2714 56/49 989 R01L OTS UFN
SMF 90 BKN 3HK 2208 62/55 988
LAX CLR 5 BCMG CLR 2HK CHC 1F
SCK 50 BKN 5 CHC 10 OVCST 1F 2000Z 50VCST 1F
SFO CLR 15 OCNL 50 BKN 10 2000Z 50 BKN 10 BCMG 15 OVCST 5
SMF CLR 3 OCNL 50 BKN 2
CA-NV: WK LO 400 SW SFO MVG NE. BLCKG HI VCT LV$ WL MV SE BY 1200Z TMRW.
CLDS,WX:
CSTL CA: CLR-BKN MDL CLD, VIS 5-10 THRU PD. INT VLYS CA: MDL CLD WL
BCM LO CLDS AND FOG, CLD 05-10 BKN-OVCST VIS 2-30CNL BLO IF. SO CAL:
CLR 2-SHK OCNL 1-3HK. SFC WDS 22-26 10-15 THRU PD.
NOTAMS:
LAX: R25L OTS MTNCE TO 1800Z TODAY. TRKS AND PERS ON TAXIWYS SO OF R25R.
SFO: R01L OTS UFN DUE RESFCG.
SMF: R34 MALS OTS AFTER 0100Z TMRW. R34 GS OTS MNTNCE.
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Appendix K: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SCRIPT
TCAS EXPERIMENT SCENARIO 6, SACRAMENTO TO LOS ANGELES
NOTE: In all scripts, normal communications from NASA aircraft are indicated. If unusual
requests are received, controller should coordinate with experiment controller (ECON) prior
to acting on request. ECON is on PBX ext. 25. Communications with other aircraft are
indicated. Content of communications is given, but controllers are free to use their own
phraseology, as long as they maintain consistency across experiments.
COMM. FREQUENCIES:
SMF ATIS: 126.75
SMF CLEARANCE: 121.1
SMF GROUND CONTROL: 121.7
SMF TOWER: 125.7
SMF DEPARTURE: 124.5
ZOA LOW SECTOR: 124.2
ZOA HIGH SECTOR: 132.8
ZLA HIGH SECTOR: 135.3
ZLA LOW SECTOR: 135,5
LAX APPROACH STL: 124.5
LAX TOWER: 133.9
LAX GROUND CTL: 121.65
LAX ARRIVAL ATIS: 133.8
OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THIS SCENARIO:
UAL 893:
FT 061:
PSA 552:
SW 239:
N 2PM:
FOG 26:
AC 732:
N 267J:
N 456XX)
N 328XX)
N 165XX)
N 5XX)
N 6XX)
AIC 228:
Taxiing and taking off ahead of ownship; parallels 716 to LAX
Descending to McClellan during ownship climb
Northwest-bound at FL 240 above ownship at FROGO
Southwest on J-110 to RPI at FL 350
Northeast on J-110 from RPI at FL 310
Navy fighter climbing on J-65 southeast of RPI
Northwest-bound for Vancouver from LAX
Climbing west northwest of Santa Monica
No comm traffic vicinity of Santa Monica and LAX
727 departing runway 24L after 716 touches down
Sacramento Metropolitan Field ATIS: Sacramento Metro information Whiskey. Sacramento
weather 6000 broken, visibility 4 miles, haze. Temperature 61, dewpoint 56, altimeter 29.88.
Winds 230 at 14. Glide slope runway 34 out of service. Traffic landing and departing run-
way 16. Inform on initial contact that you have information Whiskey.
716 is parked at gate 2, main terminal building.
716 calls for clearance
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SMFCLR:
route. Maintain 7000, expect 330 after Thorne.
716 calls for taxi
SMFC_ND: United 893, Tower at Alpha.
SMFGND: 716, follow the 727 to runway 16, Tower at Alpha.
716 calls for takeoff clearance
SMFTWR: 716, you're number 2 for takeoff.
SMFTWR: United 893, cleared for takeoff runway 16. Straight out to 4000.
SMFTWR: 716, position and hold runway 16 following United.
716, cleared to Los Angeles via the FROGO 5 departure, Friant, flight plan
Squawk 6534, departure on 124.5.
(When appropriate:)
SMFTWR: 716, cleared for takeoff; observe the SID.
(When appropriate:)
SMFTWR: 716, Departure now.
(After __ 716 makes contact:)
SACDEP: 716, radar contact, climb maintain 7000.
SACDEP: UAL 893, contact Oakland Center 124.2.
UAL893: Oakland Center, 124.2.
(When appropriate:)
SACDEP: 716, Oakland on 124.2.
(After 716 contacts:)
ZOA24L: 716, climb maintain 17000.
ZOA24L: MAC 387, descend and maintain 7000, contact Sacramento Approach on 124.5.
M12387: Leaving for 7000, Sacramento Approach on i24.5.
(Reference FT 61:)
ZOA24L: 716, maintain 15,000; traffic 1 o'clock, 10 miles, out of 18,000 going to
McClellan.
UAL893: (contact Oakland Center)
ZOA24L: UAL 893, climb maintain flight level 330.
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UAL893: (_Appropriate response)
ZOA24L: Tiger 61, traffic 10 o'clock, 9 miles, a 727_eastbound; he'll be at 15,000.
ZOA24L: UAL 893, contact Oakland Center on 132:8.
UAL893: (Appropriate response)
(When appropriate:)
ZOA24L: _ 716, clear of traffic, climb maintain flight level 230, contact Oakland on
132.8.
(After
ZOAI5H:
716 contacts:)
716, good evening. Climb maintain flight level 240.
(If _ 716 requests direct, respond unable at this time)
, lower shortly.
PSA552: PSA 552 requesting lower.
ZOAI5H: PSA 552, unable lower now; traffic at
(When appropriate, call PSA 552 as traffic)
(After clear:)
ZOA15H: PSA 552, descend and maintain flight level 180.
PSA552: (Appropriate response)
ZOA15H: _ 716, climb maintain flight level 330, direct Friant.
ZOAI5H: PSA 552,contactOakland Center 124._
PSA552: (Appropriate response) r
(Approaching Friant, call SW 239 and N 2PM astraffic for each other, than call both as
traffic for __ 716)
(When _ 716 is 27 miles south of Friant:) -_
OAK15H: Fog 26, maintain flight level 310. ---
(30 seconds later:)
OAK15H: Fog 26, Fog 26, if you read Center, maintain 310, right to 180
degrees...(pause)...Fog 26 on Guard, IMMEDIATE right turn to 180.
(time next so instruction for 716 too late:)
OAKI5H: 716, immediate left turn to 130. _.
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(when appropriate:)
OAK15H: __ 716, sorry about that; resume normal navigation direct DERBB.
OAK15H: Fog 26, contact Edwards radar, climb maintain flight level 450.
(when __ 716 east of Avenal:)
OAK15H: 716, contact Los Angeles on 135.3.
(after _ 716 contacts:)
ZLA26H: 716 at 330, roger.
AC 732: AC 732 leaving flight level for FL 350.
ZLA26H: Roger AC 732.
(when __ 716 at DERBB:)
ZLA26H: __ 716, clearedfor the Fillmorearrivalto Los Angeles,profiledescentat pilot's
discretiontocrossFillmoreat 16,000. Los Angeles altimeter29.85.
(when appropriate:)
ZLA26H: 716,Los Angeles 135.5.
(after__ 716 contacts:)
LAX14L: __ 716, roger;crossFillmore at 15,000,Santa Monica at 7,000. You can delete
the speed restriction.
(when __ 716 passing14,000ft:)
LAXI4L: __ 716,trafficII o'clock,9 miles,westbound, a Centurion climbing VFR, should
be wellbelow you.
LAX14L: Centurion 267J, trafficI o'clock,7 miles,southbound descendingto 15,000.
N 267J: 267J, looking.
LAX14L: 716,show a light.
(duringturn at SADDE:)
LAXI4L: 716, traffic10 o'clock,5 miles, eastbound, unconfirmed 7500 feet;Los
Angeles Approach now 124.5.
(after__ 716 contacts:)
LAXAPP: 716, traffic3 miles,eastbound, 7500 unverified,squawking VFR code.
Numerous targetsin the vicinityof Santa Monica. Cross Santa Monica at 7,000,maintain
5,000.
_.',
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when __
LAXAPP:
5,000.
(when
LAXAPP:
716 at Santa Monica:)
716, left to 070, vectors to the 24 right final approach course. Descend to
716 6 miles east of Santa Monica:)
716, down to 4,000; turn in 3 miles.
(give fairly tight turn to 220 to intercept close to ROMEN:)
LAXAPP: 716, right to 220, descend to 2200 feet, pick up the localizer, Tower 133.9 at
ROMEN.
(after 716 contacts:)
716, clear to land 24 right.LAXTWR:
(on touchdown:)
LAXTWR: 716, first high:speed, stay with me, hold short of the left.
cleared for takeoff 24 left.
(when appropriate:)
LAXTWR: 716, cross the left, ground point six five clearing.
LAXGND: 716, left on Uniform, taxi to your ramp.
Air Cal 228,
LAX ARRIVAL ATIS: Los Angeles International Airport arrival information Victor. Los
Angeles weather high thin broken, visibility 2, haze. Wind 210 degrees, 10 knots. Tempera-
ture 56, dew point 55, altimeter 29.85. Traffic landing and departing runways 24, 25.
Inform Approach on initial contact that you have Victor.
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Appendix L: ENCOUNTERS USED IN THE TCAS EXPERIMENT
Note: The encounters expected to produce TCAS traffic advisories and resolution advisories,
together with some programmed visual proximate traffic inserted in the scenarios to enhance
realism, are described here. It should be kept in mind that the outcome of each encounter
depended upon several variables not under control of the experimenters, including ownship
altitude rate, speed and in some cases, turn rate. Once generated, the conflict aircraft were
deterministic: they followed precommanded instructions. They were generated when own-
ship passed a certain altitude, heading or geographical or navigational coordinate.
Flight Segment: San Francisco to Stockton
TA 01: Cruise at 11,000 ft
Light twin, mode C, level, 400 ft below, crossing left to right, announced by ATC.
Intended outcome: TA, no serious hazard
Proximate Traffic (PTFC): Descent, approaching ECA VOR
Military DC-9, ahead on long final approach, announced by ATC.
Intended outcome: Proximate traffÉc, no TA, no hazard
TA 02: Established on Approach, just above undercast
Light single, mode C, climbing toward, then above, ownship, right to left, announced only to
aircraft ahead on approach
Intended outcome: TA, poorly visible, moderate hazard
Flight Segment: Stockton to Los Angeles
TA 03: Initial climb, emerging from low cloud
Light aircraft, nearly headon, mode A, level flight above ownshlp, announced by ATC, usu-
ally fairly close when observable
Intended outcome: TA, visible only when fairly close, moderate hazard
PTFC: Beginning descent after passing AVE VOR
HS-146 ahead and below ownship, same route, slower in descent, announced by ATC; ATC
separation provided
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no TA
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TA 04 (RA): Descent inside SMO, SCK-LAX
Light aircraft, left to right, nearly head-on, 100' below altitude to which ownship is cleared,
passes slightly to right and slightly below if ownship levels precisely; mode C; visibility rela-
tively poor; unannounced by ATC
Intended outcome: RA, limited time to react; severe hazard
TA 05: Turning to final approach, SCK-LAX
Small jet, ahem! on approach in trail, announced by ATC; visibility 4 miles
Intended outcome: TA, no hazard
PTFC: Turning to final approach, SCK-LAX
Jet transport, slightly ahead on approach to parallel runway, not announced
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic, no hazard (TA if ILS course is overshot)
Flight Segment: Los Angeles to Sacramento
¢
TA 06: Climbing below 10,000 to GMN VOR
Light twin, nearly own direction, level, much slower;; "ownship passes above; announced by
ATC as one of several targets (two visible, nearly in line)
Intended outcome: TA, visible well ahead, no hazard if climb rate maintained
TA 07: Reaching 10,000 in climb
Large turboprop, descending toward Point Mogu, crossing right to left; announced; ownship
held below target by ATC; target clearly visible
Intended outcome: TA, visible, no hazard unless restriction is missed
TA 08 (RA): Rapid descent below 10,000 on downwind, LAX-SMF
Light twin, fast, below, left to right, nearly head-on, descending more slowly than ownship;
mode C, announced before becoming Visible_ difficult to evaluate relative motion
Intended outcome: RA, moderate or severe hazard
TA 09: Turning to base leg, then to final approach at SMF
Light aircraft, mode C, crossing localizer course at outer marker from left to right on first
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contact; visible; depending on ownship turns, may be a problem twice, though 500-700 ft
below; hot-announced by ATC
Inten¢led outcome: TA once or twice, no hazard unless ownship descends early
Flight Segment: Sacramento to San Francisco
TA 10 (RA): Descending on visual approach to SFO
Light aircraft, mode C, left to right passing level below ownship in descent; probable RA if
ownship follows descent profile correctly; good visibility, but traffic is observed against many
ground lights
Intended outcome: TA, often RA, moderate hazard
PTFC: On visual approach to SFO
Transport, descending and convergin from left; passes well above ownship enroute to OAK
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no hazard
TA 11: On final approach at outer marker
Light aircraft, mode A, 400 ft below passing left to right, unannounced
Intended outcome: TA or proximate traffic, no hazard but distracting
Flight Segment: San Francisco to Sacramento
TA 12: On standard instrument departure below 10,000 ft
Light twin, head-on, 9500', mode C, above TCA; ownship climbing to 11,000, target clearly
visible, announced by ATC but not communicating
Intended outcome: Depends on climb rate. Probable TA, possible RA, minimal hazard.
PTFC: On standard instrument departure below 10,000 ft
Jet traffic descending through 10,000, crossing left to right enroute to Oakland; at normal
climb rate, ownship should be well above (one of two aircraft visible at this point in climb)
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no hazard
Flight Segment: Sacramento to Los Angeles
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TA 13:Duringenrouteclimb,passing17,000ft
Military jet transport, crossing right to left in slow descent, passes about 1300 ft below own-
ship; ATC announcement and separation if required
Intended outcome: Proximate tramc only, no hazard unless slow climb rate
PTFC: During enroute climb, passing 21,000 it, joining airway
Jet, opposite direction on airway, 25,000 ft. ATC separates aircraft, clears ownship for climb
after passing
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no hazard
PTFC: In cruise at 33,000 it, passing FRA VOR
Two jet aircraft, one 2000 ft above left to right, the other 2000 ft below, right to left, on J-
110; both announced by ATC
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no hazard unless ownship not yet at cruising alti-
tude (this occurred in one instance)
TA 14 (RA): In cruise, 30 miles south of FRA VOR
Military fighter converging on ownship from right and behind; very fast, climbing at high
rate through ownship altitude with radio failure. Climb terminates just below ownship alti-
tude. Announced by ATC; ATC unable to resolve problem by stopping climb.
Intended outcome: Resolution advisory or possible TCAS Invalid; serious hazard.
TA 15: During descent into terminal area passing 11,000 ft
Light twin, climbing and passing left to right, crosses 400-500 ft above ownship if descent
maintained; not announced by ATC; clearly visible
Intended outcome: TA, possible RA; moderate hazard
TA 16: During descentto SMO VOR, passing8000 ft
Light aircraftto left,overtaken by ownship. Mode C, announced by ATC; level7500 ft,
ownship clearedto crossSMO at 7000 ft
Intended outcome: TA, often visible, minimal hazard
Flight Segment: Los Angeles to Stockton
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TA 17 (RA): In cruise flight at 31,000 ft approaching RPI VOR
In instrument conditions; small jet descending from right to left at high descent.rate; ATC
preoccupied with military refueling exercise loses track of separation. Target crosses ownship
slightly ahead, passes 200 ft below ownship. Cannot be detected without TCAS.
Intended outcome: Resolution advisory, probably crossing; severe hazard
PTFC: In descent to Stockton
Jet aircraft, ahead; ownship overtaking; ATC provides separation.
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only, no hazard
TA 18: Established on final approach to Stockton
Light aircraft, no transponder, crossing ILS course at outer marker; poorly visible because of
fog, 300-400 ft above ownship; not announced by ATC
Intended outcome: TCAS cannot provide warning; visual separation only, moderate hazard
PTFC: On final approach to Stockton
Jet aircraft, 5 miles ahead on final approach, announced by ATC; not visible because of low
cloud and fog
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic only; no hazard
Flight Segment: Stockton to San Francisco
TA 19: On departure from Stockton, passing 2000 ft
Light aircraft, left to right at 2700 ft, level; becomes visible; mode A; announced by ATC
shortly after takeoff as "altitude unknown"
Intended outcome: TA only (mode A); moderate hazard
TA 20 (RA): In cruise at 10,000 ft TA 21:
TA 20, large jet in descent with electrical problem, cleared to ll,000 it; does not terminate
descent at 11,000, passes left to right ahead of ownship in close proximity. Announced by
ATC with TA 21.
TA 21: light turboprop, level at 9500 it, almost head-on, opposite direction; clearly visible
but blocks ownship descent reference TA 20.
Intended outcome: Resolution advisory, possible TCAS Invalid; severe hazard reference TA
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20, no hazard referenceTA 21
TA 22: In descent for visual approach at San Francisco
Military fighter descending, crossing left to right toward Alameda NAS; slightly faster, over-
takes but passe_ well below ownship; announced by ATC; no separation required.
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic or TA; no hazard
TA 23: Approaching outer marker at San Francisco
Air carrier727 ahead to left,approaching leftrunway (ownship clearedfor approach to
right). Announced by ATC, separation provided if necessary. Target declares missed
approach be]ow 1000 ft,continuesstraightahead in climb.
Intended outcome: Proximate traffic, same direction, TA only if ATC permits ownship to get
too close.
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Appendix M: DATA FORMS USED BY OBSERVERS
EXPERIMENT OBSERVER FORM
(Fillout foreach conflict)
Date:
TCAS mode:
Crew number:
Start at SFO / LAX
Lighting conditions:twilight/ night
Origin & destination:
Leg sequence:
Flying: Capt / FirstOfficer
Time:
Video tape number:
IntruderID:
TA / RA
Altitudecrossing:yes / no
Visualcontact: yes / no
Conflictwith clearance:yes / no
Aircraftconfiguration:
ATC trafficadvisory: yes / no
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ANALYSIS OF EACH RESOLUTION ADVISORY
1)
z)
Run number
Capt or F/O flying
Type of RA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
RA sequencial number for crew
RA sequencial number for pilot
Tail/flight number of intruder
Type of RA
corrective / preventive
Altitude crossing RA
Meteorological conditions
Visual acquisition
ATC advisory on intruder
Pilot Response
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
25)
26)
27)
Manual vs. autopilot response
time of TA
time of RA
altitude at RA
time of change in stick or throttle position
Time attained commanded vertical speed (1500 clb/desc}
vertical speed at max deviation during RA
altitude at max deviation during RA
time of RA off
altitude at RA off
time to initiate return to altitude at RA off
Maximum vert speed after RA off if > during RA
altitude at max deviation after RA off if > during RA
Time to return to RA altitude*
heading change if >10 degrees +/- right/left
max bank if heading change > 10 deg
TA altitude if climbed/descended on TA
Achieved Separation
28)
29)
3o)
31)
Minimum slant range of intruder
Time of minimum slant range
Vertical miss distance at rain range
Horizontal miss distance at rain range
*use altitude at TA if pilot maneuvered on TA
use the altitude +/- 300 feet when had been level
use the vertical speed just before the maneuver if climbing/descending
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Appendix N: WORKLOAD RATING SCALES
Note: The workloadrating instrument used in this study was the NASA
Task Load Index (TLX), Version 1.0, provided by the Human Performance
Research Group at NASA-Ames Research Center. Extracts from the test
booklet are shown in the following pages:
Rating scale definitions, shown and briefed to flight crews dur-
ing the instruction period on the day before the experiment.
A sample rating sheet. One of these sheets was completed by
each flight crew member after arrival at blocks following each
flight segment.
The workload comparison sheet, filled out by each flight crew
member prior to debriefing after the final flight of the day.
Each crew member was asked to choose between the dimen-
sions shown in each comparison.
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Subject ID: Task ID:
RATING SHEET
MENTAL DEMAND
I, i., I, I, i, L,l,, I, 1_,I,I
Low High
PHYSICAL DEMAND
Ill,lil,l,l,ili,l,l,i
Low High
TEMPORAL DEMAND
I, i i i, i, i, ],__.l, i , I I i I I
Low High
PERFORMANCE
1,1_,I,1_1,
Good
,!,1,1,1,1
Poor
EFFORT
I,I,i,i,i,l,l,l,l,l,i
Low High
FRUSTRATION
i,l,i,l,i,l,i,l,l,i,i
Low High
8O
_ II
RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS
|
TITLE ENOPOINTg EHEFINITION8
MENTAL
DEMAND
LOW/HIGH
How much mental and perceptual
activity was required (e.g., thinking
deciding, calculating, remembering,
looking, searching, etc.)? Was the
task easy or demanding, simple or
complex, exacting or forgiving?
PHYSICAL
DEMAND
LOW/HIGH
How much physical activity was
required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turn-
ing, controlling, activating, etc.)?
Was the task easy or demanding,
slow or brisk, slack or strenuous,
restful or laborious?
TEMPORAL
DEMAND
LOW/HIGH
How much tlme pressure did you
feel due to the rate or pace at Which
the tasks or task elements occurred?
Was the pace slow and leisurely or
rapid and frantic?
PERFORMANCE GOOD/POOR
How successful do you think you
were In accomplishing the goals of
the task set by the experimenter (or
yourself)? How satisfied w(pre you
with your performance In accom-
plishing these goals?
EFFORT LOW/HIGH
How hard did you have to work
(mentally and physically) to accom-
plish your level of performance?
FRUSTRATION LOW/HIGH
How insecure, discouraged, Irritated,
stressed and annoyed versus secure,
gratified, content, relaxed and com-
placent did you feel during the task?
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WORKLOAD COMPARISON
EFFORT
OR
PERFORMANCE
PERFORMANCE
OR
FRUSTRATION
FRUSTRATION
OR
EFFORT
MENTAL DEMAND
OR
PHYS_AL DEMAND
TEMPORAL DEMAND
OR
FRUSTRAT_N
_HYSICAL DEMAND
OR
TEMPORAL DEMAND
PERFORMANCE
OR
MENTAL DEMAND
EFFORT
OR
PHYSICAL DEMAND
TEPMORAL OEMA_ZO
OR
EFFORT
PHYSICAL DEMAND
OR
PERFORMAf4CE
PERFORMANCE
OR
TEMPORAL DEMAND
FRUSTRATION
OR
MENTAL DEMAND
I
PHYSICAL OEMANO
OR
FRUSTRATION
TEMPORAL DEMAND
OR
MENTAL DEMAND
MENTAL DEMAND
OR
EFPORT
c_nCLE THE WOFUKLOAO D_MENSJON THAT _EP.nESENT$ THE k_ORE IMP0_I _,ANT CONTRJEIUTOFI TO WC,rlKLOAD FOR THI= sr=EcIFfC TASI<[S}
YOU PERFORMED tN THIS STI.E:,Y.
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Append|x O: TCAS POST-FLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRES
Note: Questionnaires appropriate to the TCAS Condition experienced were
filled out by all crew members during their debriefing sessions. Though some
questions differed, most questions were presented to all TCAS-equipped crews
(conditions 2, 3, 4). A shorter questionnaire was presented to non-TCAS
crews.
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Post-Flight questionnaire for the NASA/FAA TEAS Human Factors Study
Now that you have this simulation we would like to get your evaluation
of the system and its use. Remember this research will provide input
to the ultimate design and implementation of the TEAS which will even-
tually be in your airplane. It is very important that you carefully
answer each question. Generally it is best to record the response
that first comes to mind.
This questionnaire is meant to be a starting point for your evalua-
tion, don't limit your responses to these questions. Use the reverse
sides of the pages to expand and extrapolate froa these issues.
Please mark the point on the scale best representing your evaluation
of the following items.
Crew Member: Capt F/O S/O
In comparing this simulation to typical line flights:
1. The cockpit procedures and duties in this simulation were:
very
unrealistic
very
realistic
2. The air traffic control services in this simulation were:
very very
unrealistic r°o,i ta 
3. The aircraft response to manual control input was:
very very
unrealistic realistic
4. The differences between the aircraft you fly and this simulator were:
very not at all
distracting distracting
5. How often were you aware of the location of known traffic?
never always
6. The information from ATE traffic advisories and seeing the aircraft out
of the window was:
often never
conflicting I l l l l l l l___l l l conflicting
7. Did you ever take evasive action to avoid another aircraft? yes no
8. What type of evasive maneuver do you prefer?
no preference climbs/descents turns
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g. What are your current procedures for ATC traffic advisories and
see-and-avoid?
10. What ways could the air traffic controller better help you to avoid near
mid air collisions?
11. Based upon your actual flight experience does a collision threat exist?
strongly strongly
disagree agree
questions Concerning the use of the TCAS:
12. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the operation
and limitations of TCAS is:
very very
limited complete
13. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the TCAS traffic
advisory is:
very very
limited c_plete
14. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the TCAS maneuver
advisory is:
very very
limited complete
15. The training you received for TCAS use was:
very
inadequate
very
adequat_
16. The operational procedures for TCAS use were:
very
inappropriate
very
appropriate
17. The addition of TCAS to the other flight duties was:
very
distracting
not at all
distracting
18. After several months of use in line service TCAS ,ould be:
very not at all
distracting distracting
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lg. For reducing the risk of mid-air collisions, TCAS was:
not at all
useful
very
useful
20. For aiding visual contact with the traffic, TEAS was:
not at all very
useful I__1__1__1__1 I 1__1 1__1 1 useful
21. Would TEAS affect the time you normally spend scanning for traffic?
increase decrease
scan time __1__1__1 scan time
22. The information from ATC traffic advisories and the TCAS was:
often never
conflicting conflicting
23. Would TCAS increase or decrease contact with ATC?
greatly greatly
increase decrease
24. In rare instances TEAS is unable to recommend a resolution ("Unable to
Command"), given this limitation, do you feel TEAS is an acceptable system
for reducing the risk of mid-air collisions?
very very
unacceptable I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I acceptable
25,-What did you do when this occured?
26. Was the aural alert and caution/warning light effective in getting your
attention?
very very
ineffective I 1___1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 effective
27. Was the aural alert and caution/warning light distracting in their
function of getting your attention?
very not at all
distracting distracting
28. In preparing for evasive maneuvers, the TEAS traffic advisory was:
not at all very
useful useful
29. In executing TEAS evasive maneuvers, the voice command was:
not ab all very
useful useful
30. For communicating the recommended evasive action or restriction to
vertical rate, the lights on the IVSZ were:
difficult bo easy to
interpret interpret
31. The average time it took you to initiabe the evasive maneuver, afber the
TCAS warning, was seconds.
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32. The evasive maneuvers as prescribed by TCAS were:
very
unacceptable
very
acceptable
33. The IVSI indications of unsafe vertical rates (when evasive action was
not required) were:
not at all very
useful useful
34. Did you ever take evasive action without being told to by TCAS? yes no
if so, did you do so based on visual contact with the traffic? yes no
35. Did you ever maneuver differently than TCAS instructed? yes no
36. If so, please explain
37. Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver that required you to
cross through another aircraft's altitude?
very not at all
reluctant reluctant
38. Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver in conflict with your
ATC clearance?
very not at all
reluctant reluctant
39. Would you be reluctant to maneuver in conflict with your ATC clearance if
the rules were changed so that TCAS evasive action was endorsed?
very not at all
reluctant reluctant
40. Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver in IMC?
very not at all
reluctant reluctant
41. Operation of TCAS in IMC and VMC was:
very
different
not at all
different
Please explain:
42. Would you be satisfied with this TCAS system as a safety enhancement to
the airplane you fly?
greatly greatly
dissatisfied satisfied
43. Were there instances where the TCAS did not perform as you expected it to?
Please explain:
44. Were inappropriate maneuvers prescribed? Please explain:
45. How often did you contact ATC regarding traffic conflicts identified by
TCAS?
always I__1__1__1 I__1__1__1__1__1__1 never
46. What changes would be appropriate in pilot and controller operating
procedures with the implementation of TCAS?
47. What is the feature you liked most, about, TCAS?
48. What is the feature you liked least, about TCAS?
quest,ions Concerning t,he Informat,ion on t,he Traffic Advisory Display:
49. In general, the t,raffic informat,ion was:
not at, all
useful
very
useful
50. The inforBat,ion on t,he display was:
not ay all very
legible legible
51. Interpreting.the information on t,he display was:
difficult, t,o easy to
int,erpret, I__1__1__1__1__1__1__1__1__1__1 in rpret,
52. Were t,he different colors and symbol shapes of targets helpful in
recognizing threat,s?
not, at, all very
helpful helpful
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52a. Were the different colors of targets helpful in recognizing threats?
not at all very
helpful helpful
53. The number of targets on the display was:
too
few
too
many
54. The maximum number of targets seen on the display at one time was?
55. Additional filtering of targets (either manual or aut_matic) would be:
very very
undesirable I__1 desirable
56. The 3 and 5 mile fixed range rings on the display were:
not at all very
useful useful
56a. The 2 mile fixed range ring on the display was:
not at all
useful
very
useful
57. What value of fixed range.ringswould you substitute or add?
58. The horizontal/vertical range you generally used for departure and climb
was / , for cruise / ,
for descent / , for approach /
59. Being able to vary the horizontal range for targets to be displayed was:
not at all very
useful useful
In what way?
59a.Being able to vary the horzontal range for targets _o be displayed would be
not at all very
useful useful
61. Being able bo vary the vertical range for targets to be displayed was:
not at all very
useful useful
In what way?
61a. Being able to vary the vertical range for t_rgets to be displayed
would be:
not at all very
useful useful
63. Would you prefer a system that au_tically switched horizontal and
vertical ranges? yes no
64. The location of the display was:
very
poor
very
good
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64a. Pushing the traffic switch to display the 8 most important targets being
tracked by TCAS was:
not at all very
useful useful
64b. Could the triangle symbol at the other aircraft's location be omitted
and the data block adequately represent its location? yes no
65. How often did you use the arrows to determine if traffic was climbing or
descending?
never often
66. Did the traffic display ever cause you to expect a climb when TCAS told
you to descend, or vice versa? yes no
67. Please explain:
68. In executing evasive maneuvers, the symbol for the type of maneuver in
the upper left corner was:
not at all very
useful useful
69. The refresh rate of the displayed location of the traffic was:
very very
unacceptable acceptable
70. The location of the traffic as represented on the display differed from
what was observed out of the window:
often I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I__I never
71. Would the traffic advisory display help prevent being startled
by the presence of the nearby aircraft on a parallel approach? yes no
72. The addition of the traffic advisory display to the cockpit was:
very not at all
distracting distracting
73. Did the traffic advisory display provide confidence in the correctness of
the subsequent maneuver advisory? yes no
74. Do you feel the information on the traffic advisory display is accurate
enough to be used to maneuver your aircraft? yes no
Please explain:
9O
-I-| I-
75. Did you ever maneuver without being told to by TCAS based on the
information on the traffic advisory display? yes no
76. Were there features of the display that interfered with your use of the
TCAS? yes no
Please explain
77. Your understanding of the operation of the traffic advisory display is:
very very
limited complete
78. The training you received on the traffic advisory display was:
very very
inadequate adequate
79. Would you add any information to the traffic advisory display? yes no
If so what?
80. What information would you take off of the traffic advisory display?
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" Appendix P: VERBAL DEBRIEFING OF SUBECTS
Scenario number Date
Notes for flight crews:
There was an exaggerated number of TCAS encounters in this experiment so
that we could get sufficient data.
Please don't discuss this experiment with anyone until March when we will
release the data.
We will send you the final report if you return the mailing list forms.
There will be no association of data with your airline or the individual pilots.
Comments by flight crew members:
JF:_RECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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Appendix Q: HUMAN FACTORS OF THE TCAS II COLLISION-
AVOIDANCE SYSTEM: MANEUVERS BASED ON RESOLUTION ALERTS
LCDR Robert J. Tuttell, USN
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
March, 1988
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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HUMAN FACTORS OF THE TCAS II COLLISION-AVOIDANCE SYSTEM:
MANEUVERS BASED ON RESOLUTION ALERTS
INTRODUCTION
The overburdened United States air traffic control system has failed to
prevent a significant number of near midair collisions during the last few
years. The increase in air traffic due to airline deregulation has saturated the
current air traffic control system and has spurred the development of practical
airborne collision avoidance systems.
Three levels of collision avoidance system have been proposed for use in U. S.
national airspace. "TCAS" is an abbreviation for "Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System". The major difference between the three systems, other
than cost, is the amount and type of collision avoidance maneuver informa-
tion that is provided to the pilot. The TCAS I system provides no avoidance
maneuver commands, while the TCAS II system directs evasive maneuvers in
the vertical plane only (climbs and descents). The TCAS II[ system provides
turns in addition to climbs and descents. The major disadvantage of all three
systems is that the intruder aircraft must be transponder equipped in order to
be tracked by the TCAS system. Additionally, for a TCAS II or TCAS III
equipped aircraft to receive collision avoidance commands, the intruder air-
craft must have a mode C (altitude reporting) transponder.
This report describes the effect of corrective resolution advisories on separa-
tion between conflicting aircraft. Information obtained from a NASA-Ames
simulation using airline flight crews and a Boeing 727 flight simulator was
examined and analyzed to determine the effect on vertical and slant-range
separation of maneuvers conducted in response to maneuver advisories gen-
erated by TCAS II.
The research was conducted under the Navy-NASA Joint Institute of
Aeronautics Program. Analysis of the data was completed using the facilities
of the NASA-Ames Research Center and the Naval Postgraduate School.
TCAS IISYSTEM DESCRIPTION
TCAS II is a self-contained system designed to preserve ATC vertical separa-
tion by tracking aircraft, evaluating collision potential, and displaying
advisories and warnings. The warnings include recommended evasive
maneuvers in the vertical plane. The system computes the range, relative
altitude, and bearing of nearby aircraft by interrogating their transponders
and evaluating the replies.
The traffic's relative altitude and position information is displayed by color
coded symbols on a traffic display (Vol. I, Fig. 1). Display characteristics
differ among the airlines. The traffic advisory display covers an area at least
six NM ahead of the aircraft to three NM behind the aircraft. Intruder
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aircraft are colored amber unless they pose a collision threat within 20 to 30
seconds. If the intruder aircraft is determined to be a threat, the TCAS com-
puter changes the color of the symbol to red, and activates warning tones, a
warning voice, and red lights on the glareshield. These warnings direct the
pilot's attention to the resolution advisory (RA) display which displays
recommended evasive action.
The RA display is an IVSI (Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator) which
has been modified with red "eyebrow" lights around the circumference to indi-
cate whether a climb or descent is required to increase separation distance.
The warning lights will extinguish, and a voice will state "clear of conflict s'
when the collision threat no longer exists. Installation of the system requires
the addition of an antenna on top of the fuselage, a computer unit (black box)
and a mode S transponder. If two conflicting aircraft are equipped with the
TCAS II system, collision avoidance maneuvers will be coordinated automati-
cally by their respective TCAS computer units through the mode S tran-
sponder data link.
MANEUVERS BASED ON RESOLUTION ADVISORIES OR ALERTS
Introduction
The TCAS II Resolution Advisory (RA) warning consists of an aural tone and
a red warning light on the glareshield. These warnings direct the pilot's
attention to the resolution advisory display (modified IVSI). The red "eye-
brow" lights on the instrument will illuminate directing the pilot to modify
the aircraft's vertical speed to "keep the IVSI needle out of the red". Simul-
taneously, a computer generated voice will suggest a course of action to the
flight crew. The voice commands used in this study were: "cllmb"; "climb
to cross"; "adjust vertical speed"; "descend"; "descend to cross";
"clear of conflict"; and "unable to command".
These commands are given assuming the pilot does not have visual contact
with the conflicting aircraft. If visual contact with the other aircraft is
gained, the pilot may elect to maneuver using his own judgment to avoid the
conflicting traffic. Flight crew responses depend on the prior training they
have received.
Two types of resolution advisories are issued. A preventive resolution
advisory requires no immediate action but warns the crew not to climb, des-
cend, or adjust vertical speed due to nearby traffic. A corrective resolution
advisory directs the pilot to alter the vertical speed of the aircraft to ensure
safe separation from nearby traffic in the vertical plane.
The goal of the TCAS II system is to produce safe vertical separation between
aircraft by signaling for a smooth, controlled adjustment of the TCAS
aircraft's vertical speed until clear of the conflicting traffic.
This report examines the effectiveness of the TCAS II resolution advisory
display for 40 encounters. The encounters involved crews using various ver-
sions of the TCAS II system while flying a Boeing 727 simulator in a
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simulatedair traffic environment at the NASA-Ames Research Center.
Only corrective resolution advisories are examined in this report.
Procedures
An airborne collision avoidance system is only effective if the flight crews
using the system are adequately trained to use the system to increase the
vertical separation between aircraft.
An increase in vertical separation also_ results in an increase in slant range
(i.e. miss distance) at the closest point of approach (CPA) between the TCAS
equipped aircraft and the conflicting traffic. In order to determine the
effectiveness of pilot responses to resolution alerts, 12 airline crews flew short
routes in a simulated air traffic environment with numerous traffic conflicts.
Forty encounters were examined in which the crews were required to perform
evasive maneuvers based on TCAS warnings on the resolution advisory
display. For each encounter, the following parameters were computed and
examined:
(1) The amount of time between the traffic advisory (TA) and the closest
point of approach (CPA) between the TCAS equipped aircraft and the
conflicting aircraft.
(2) The amount of time between the resolution alert (RA) and the CPA for
the two aircraft.
(3) The amount of time between the TA and RA. This is the amount of time
the crew had to examine the potential conflict and prepare for the evasive
maneuver.
(4) The vertical separation between the two aircraft at CPA after performing
the collision avoidance maneuver.
(5) The slantrange (miss distance)between the two aircraftat CPA after
performing the recommended evasivemaneuver.
These results were obtained using computer records which contained raw data
on the following parameters: RA and TA on and off times; latitude and long-
itude readouts for both the TCAS aircraft and the conflicting aircraft; and
altitude readouts for both aircraft.
A computer program was written to evaluate these raw data. Additional
records detailingthe encounters included observer records and resolution
advisory analysisforms. Video tapes of the flightstationof the Boeing 727
simulator were viewed to determine Air TrafficControl (ATC) clearance
requirements,requiredleveloffaltitudes,and flightcrew responses.
In addition to the five results listed above, additional computations were
made to determine the flight path the aircraft would have flown if it were not
TCAS equipped. This flight path was based on the assumption that the crew
did not obtain a visual sighting of the conflicting aircraft and therefore did
not maneuver to avoid it.
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Additional assumptions included the following: the crew would fly the same
track over the ground; the crew would comply with all required ATC turns
and navigation turns; and the crew would comply with all level off restrictions
required by ATC. These assumptions are considered reasonable since the
TCAS II system directs evasive maneuvers in the vertical plane only, and the
altitude of the TCAS aircraft during each scenario is of primary concern.
For each scenario, the altitude of the TCAS aircraft was modified in the com-
puter program to account for the descent or climb rate in progress before the
evasive maneuver occurred. The TCAS aircraft's vertical rate was calculated
beginning five seconds prior to the resolution alert. The program accounted
for level off clearances and maneuvers that occurred on the traffic advisory
display information. The TCAS aircraft altitudes were incrementally calcu-
lated, beginning one second after the RA occurred, until CPA or a level off
altitude was reached. The same five results that were listed previously for the
TCAS maneuver were then determined for the case where no TCAS maneuver
was performed. The differences between the vertical separation and slant
range at CPA were compared for the TCAS maneuver case and the no
maneuver case.
Several corrective resolution alerts in the NASA-Ames study could not be
examined due to a problem with the data files containing the conflicting
aircraft's position and altitude information. The system could only record
data on two aircraft at one time.
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Results
A summary of the data for the 40 encounters is contained in Table 1. It lists
the following information for each encounter: the time interval between the
traffic alert (TA) and CPA; the time interval between the resolution alert
(RA) and CPA; the time interval between the TA and RA; the altitude
difference between the TCAS aircraft and the conflicting aircraft at CPA; the
altitude difference at CPA between the two aircraft that would have occurred
assuming the TCAS collision avoidance maneuver had not been performed (no
TCAS maneuver case}; the altitude separation difference between the TCAS
maneuver and no TCAS maneuver scenarios; and the slant range difference
between the TCAS maneuver and no TCAS maneuver scenarios.
The time interval between the issuance of a traffic advisory (TA) to the crew
and time of CPA of the two aircraft represents the amount of time available
for the crew to evaluate the situation and react appropriately if a RA display
had not been installed. Several crews in the study were able to predict the
occurrence of some of the resolution alerts by observing potential collision
situations developing on the traffic advisory display. The average time inter-
val between the TA and CPA was 39.25 seconds with a sample standard devi-
ation of 12.03.
The time interval between the issuance of a resolution alert (RA) to the crew
and the time of CPA of the two aircraft represents the amount of time avail-
able for the crew to interpret the information on the RA display and react by
maneuvering the aircraft prior to CPA. The average time interval was 23.03
seconds with a sample standard deviation of 10.96.
The intervalbetween the issuanceof the TA and the RA is the amount of
time the crew had to evaluate the situationdevelopingon the trafficadvisory
display(ifinstalled)and prepare to execute the evasivemaneuver. The aver-
age time intervalwas 16.23secondswith a sample standard deviationof6.24.
Of the 40 encounters examined, 37 showed an increase in altitude separation
at CPA as a result of the TCAS maneuver. The three encounters that
showed less altitude separation due to the TCAS maneuvers are encounters 3,
11 and 23. These three cases are similar and are discussed below.
The altitude separation changes resulting from the TCAS maneuver were
computed by subtracting the no TCAS maneuver altitude separation at CPA
from the results obtained by performing the evasive maneuver. Of the 40
encounters examined, 37 showed a positive change in the altitude separation
at CPA as a result of the TCAS maneuver. The three encounters that
showed negative values due to the TCAS maneuvers are the same three men-
tioned above. The TCAS maneuver resulted in an average increase in alti-
tude separation of 577.9 feet.
The slantrange changes caused by performing the TCAS maneuver were com-
puted by subtractingthe value of the no TCAS maneuver slantrange at CPA
from the value obtained forthe evasivemaneuver. As in the other figures,37
encounters demonstrated a positivechange in the slantrange at CPA as a
resultof the TCAS maneuver. The same three scenarios(3,11, 23) showed
negative values. The average increasein the slant range resultingfrom a
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TCAS maneuver was 187.50 feet.
The 40 encounters used in this study are described briefly below. The 12 air-
line crews who participated in the study flew similar routes and encountered
similar air traffic conditions. Eight of the 12 crews (conditions 3 and 4) flew
with fully operational TCAS II systems which had both a traffic advisory
display and a resolution advisory display. The other four crews (2111, 2221,
2312, and 2412, condition 2) used a minimal system without a traffic display.
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Table 1. SUMMARY OF ENCOUNTER ANALYSES
--Run TA- RA- TA- Verticaldistance Verticaldistance Altitude Diff Slant Rg Diff
No. CPA CPA RA Maneuver No maneuver TCAS-NoTCAS TCAS-NoTCAS
1 29 18 11 684.8 295.3 389.5 327.6
2 34 20 14 1005.4 121.5 883.9 648.8
3 25 5 20 1026.9 1051.4 -24.5 -2.2
4 32 18 14 1661.4 652.1 1009.3 118.8
5 19 18 1 425.5 80.7 344.8 89.9
6 42 26 16 581.5 30.6 550.9 31.0
7 27 14 13 1528.0 703.4 824.6 176.2
8 51 36 15 1215.2 382.8 832.4 104.3
9 32 17 15 701.6 18.6 683.0 432.1
10 66 30 36 776.6 93.4 683.2 188.5
11 30 17 13 140.4 645.8 -505.4 -22.0
12 35 14 21 693.4 463.9 229.5 51.5
13 42 27 15 955.1 99.6 855.5 435.4
14 46 28 18 861.4 169.1 692.3 210.9
15 39 26 13 1865.6 257.6 1608.0 316.0
16 52 35 17 1454.2 130.7 1323.5 185.2
17 34 19 15 1860.2 408.4 1451.8 1536.9
18 44 26 18 1105.7 57.6 1048.1 197.2
19 45 29 16 770.5 44.9 725.6 172.6
20 36 21 15 816.8 562.5 254.3 224.0
21 41 26 15 611.7 239.0 372.7 130.3
22 31 17 14 1359.1 1174.8 184.3 61.1
23 33 15 18 264.2 653.7 -389.5 -19.7
24 39 4 35 559.7 522.2 37.5 13.6
25 43 22 21 912.2 127.5 784.7 184.7
26 40 24 16 421.4 374.4 47.0 2.8
27 41 35 6 1648.8 185.4 1463.4 158.5
28 57 41 16 1519.3 297.7 1221.6 188.0
29 86 70 16 1004.3 982.4 21.9 13.6
30 34 18 16 453.8 105.5 348.3 68.5
31 40 24 16 545.8 44.5 501.3 38.0
32 42 26 16 653.1 188.7 464.4 159.3
33 40 24 16 1602.9 47.2 1555.7 143.4
34 43 16 27 772.7 614.7 158.0 51.4
35 25 9 16 1181.5 914.4 267.1 73.2
36 30 15 15 1195.3 699.7 495.6 88.2
37 20 16 4 1053.1 652.7 400.4 253.4
38 44 24 20 822.4 510.8 311.6 284.2
39 41 26 15 771.6 235.3 536.3 55.6
40 40 25 15 532.5 60.9 471.6 129.1
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Description of Encounters
SCENARIO #1 - CREW #2111:
CONDITIONS: time = 00:40:12; altitude -- 1996 feet (ft); descending; des-
cent rate = -4.33 feet per second (FPS) or -259 feet per minute (FPM).
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command requiring an
increase in descent rate. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude and
slant range (389 FT, 327 FT) at CPA compared to continuing to descend at
-259 FPM.
SCENARIO #2 - CREW #2111:
CONDITIONS: time -- 10:20:43; altitude -- 10145 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (883 FT, 648
FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #3 - CREW #2221:
CONDITIONS: time --- 03:52:13; altitude = 33075 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew receiveda "descend to cross"command to avoid an
intruder aircraft(callsign "FOG 26") which was climbing underneath the
TCAS aircraft.The CPA occurredfivesecondsafterthe command was given.
The maneuver resultedin a decreasein altitudeseparationand slantrange (-
24.5FT, -2.2FT) at CPA compared to continuinglevelat the assignedalti-
tude. This is the firstof three similarincidentsinvolvingFOG 26 that is
being studied to determine the cause of theseundesirableresults.The slant
range at CPA in thiscasewas 11458 FT (1.9NM).
SCENARIO #4 - CREW #2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:14;12; altitude -- 12093 FT; descending; descent
rate ffi -32.53 FPS or -1951.8 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command which
required a level off. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separa-
tion and slant range (1009 FT, 118 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the
descent at -1951FPM.
SCENARIO #5 - CREW #2221:
CONDITIONS: time -- 07:19:46; altitude = 11070 FT; leveling at 11000 FT.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (344 FT, 89 FT)
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at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #6 - CREW #2221:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:51:35; altitude = 5228 FT; descending; descent
rate = -10.15 FPS or -609 FPM; clearance -- "descend and maintain 5000
FT".
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (550 FT, 31 FT)
at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -609 FPM to a level off alti-
tude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #7 -CREW #2312:
CONDITIONS: time = 08:02:14; altitude -- 32990 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command to avoid a conflicting
aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing underneath the TCAS aircraft. Unlike
scenario 3, the climb maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation
and slant range (824 FT, 176 FT) at CPA compared to continuing level flight
at the assigned altitude. This scenario is similar to scenario 3 but had a 14
second time interval between RA and CPA and a slant range of 5309 FT (.87
NM) at CPA. In this case, the TCAS maneuver improved the separation
between the TCAS aircraft and FOG 26.
SCENARIO #8 -CREW #2312:
CONDITIONS: time -- 08:22:27; altitude = 12058 FT; descending; descent
rate = -48.86 FPS or -2931 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command fol-
lowed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted in an increase in alti-
tude separation and slant range (832 FT, 104 FT) at CPA compared to con-
tinuing to descend at -2931 FPM.
SCENARIO #9 - CREW #2312:
CONDITIONS: time = 10:02:09; altitude = 10095 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb to cross" command followed by a
"climb" command. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separa-
tion and slant range (683 FT, 432 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level
flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #10 - CREW #2312:
CONDITIONS: time -- 10:06:52; altitude -- 7639 FT; descending; descent
104 C_
iVl l_
rate = -28.8 FPS or -1728 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command cal-
ling for no descent greater than 500 FPM. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (683 FT, 188 FT) at CPA
compared to continuing the descent at -1728 FPM.
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SCENARIO #II -CREW #2422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:28:33; altitude = 33004 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew receiveda "descend to cross"command to avoid an
intruder aircraft(FOG 26) which was climbing below the TCAS aircraft.
CPA occurred 17 seconds after the command was given. The maneuver
resultedin a decreasein altitudeseparationand slant range (-505 FT, -22
FT) at CPA compared to continuing levelat the assigned altitude.This is
the second of three similar incidents involving FOG 26 that is under investi-
gation. The slant range at CPA in this case was 9009 FT (1.5 NM).
SCENARIO #12 - CREW #2422:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:28:20; altitude -- 2260 FT; descending; descent
rate = -19.53 FPS or-1171 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew receivedan "adjustverticalspeed" command cal-
ling for no descent greater than 500 FPM. The maneuver resultedin an
increasein altitudeseparationand slantrange (229 FT, 51 FT) at CPA com-
pared to continuingthe descentat -1171 FPM.
SCENARIO #13 - CREW #2422:
CONDITIONS: time ffi 10:28:03; altitude -- 5059 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -3.02 FPS or -990 FPM; clearance -- "descend and maintain 5000 FT".
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (855 FT, 435
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent to 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #14 -CREW #3111:
CONDITIONS: time = 03:36:15; altitude -- 3760 FT; descending; descent
rate = -32.62 FPS or -1957 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (692 FT, 210
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -1957 FPM.
SCENARIO #15 -CREW #3111:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:14:48; altitude = 32991 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command to avoid an
intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing underneath the TCAS air-
craft. CPA occurred 26 seconds after the command was given. Unlike
encounters 3 and 11, this maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separa-
tion and slant range (1608 FT, 316 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining
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level flight at the assignedaltitude. The slant range at CPA in this case was
5559 FT (0.9 NM) which is much smaller than the slant ranges in the two
encounters mentioned above. In this case, a "descend to cross" command
improved the situation.
SCENARIO #16- CREW #3111:
CONDITIONS: time -- 07:37:15; altitude = 11647 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -26.54 FPS or -1592 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb*' command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (1323 FT, 185
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -1592 FPM.
SCENARIO #17 - CREW #3111:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:28:25; altitude = 10016 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb to cross" command. The
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (1451
FT, 1536 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned
altitude.
SCENARIO #18 - CREW #3221:
CONDITIONS: time - 06:53:04; altitude -- 3937 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -28.49 FPS or -1709 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command fol-
lowed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted in an increase in alti-
tude separation and slant range (1048 FT, 197 FT) at CPA compared to con-
tinuing the descent at -1709 FPM.
SCENARIO #19 - CREW #3221:
CONDITIONS: time -- 09:54:04; altitude -- 5175 FT; climbing; climb rate z
+4.15 FPS or +249 FPM; clearance -- "descend and maintain 5000 FTm'.
NARRATIVE: The crew used the information from the traffic advisory
display to anticipate the collision situation developing and started to climb
shortly before they received a "climb" command from the resolution advisory
display. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and
slant range (725 FT, 172 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent to
their assigned level-off altitude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #20 - CREW #3312:
CONDITIONS: time -- 01:21:09; altitude ffi 1903 FT; descending; descent
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rate = -13.82 FPS or -829 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (254 FT, 224
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -829 FPM.
SCENARIO #21 - CREW #3312:
CONDITIONS: time = 02:33:07; altitude -- 5189 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -19.59 FPS or -1175 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (372 FT, 130
FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -1175 FPM.
SCENARIO #22 - CREW #3312:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:43:86; altitude _- 12156 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -26.06 FPS or -1563 FPM.
NARRATIVE: This is another case where the crew used the information
from the traffic advisory display to anticipate the collision situation develop-
ing and started to level off before an "adjust vertical speed" command was
received from the resolution advisory display. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (184 FT, 61 FT) at CPA com-
pared to continuing to descend at their original descent rate, which was
greater than 2000 FPM prior to the crew-initiated level off.
SCENARIO #23 - CREW #3422:
CONDITIONS: time = 03:54:10; altitude -- 32982 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command to avoid an
intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing underneath the TCAS air-
craft. CPA occurred 15 seconds after the command was given. The
maneuver resulted in a decrease in altitude separation and slant range (-389
FT, -19 FT) at CPA compared to continuing level at the assigned altitude.
This is the third of three similar incidents involving FOG 26 that is being stu-
died. The slant range at CPA in this case was 9075 FT (1.5 NM).
SCENARIO #24 - CREW #3422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:20:34; altitude = 6983 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew was leveling at 7000 FT when they received a "des-
cend" command to avoid conflicting traffic at 7500 FT. CPA occurred four
seconds after the resolution alert was issued. The maneuver resulted in a
small increase in altitude separation and slant range (37 FT, 13 FT) at CPA
compared to remaining level. It appears that the system did not consider the
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conflicting aircraft a threat until the TCAS crew arrested their descent and
leveled off. The actual altitude separation between aircraft at CPA was 560
FT with a slant range of 1496 FT.
SCENARIO #25 - CREW #3422:
CONDITIONS: time = 09:17:36; altitude = 5370 FT; climbing; climb rate --
-+-12.78 FPS or +766 FPM; clearance ffi "descend and maintain 5000 FT".
NARRATIVE: This case is similar to scenario 19. The crew used the infor-
mation from the traffic advisory display to anticipate the collision situation
developing and started to climb shortly before a "climb" command from the
resolution advisory display was received. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (784 FT, 184FT) at CPA com-
pared to continuing the descent to their assigned level-off altitude of 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #26- CREW #4111:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:13:19; altitude -- 32994 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: This case is similar to scenario 15. The crew received a "des-
cend to cross" command to avoid an intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was
climbing below the TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 24 seconds after the corm
mand was given. Unlike encounters 3, 11, and 23, the maneuver resulted in a
small increase in altitude separation and slant range (47 FT, 2.8 FT) at CPA
compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude. The slant range
at CPA in this case was 6629 FT (1.1 NM) which is smaller than the slant
ranges in the three encounters mentioned above.
SCENARIO #27 - CREW #4111:
CONDITIONS: time -- 07:34:16; altitude -- 12324 FT; descending; descent
rate --- -55.72 FPS or -3343 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command which
required no descent greater than 1000 FPM. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (1463 FT, 158 FT) at CPA
compared to continuing the descent at -3343 FPM.
SCENARIO #28 - CREW #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:10:59; altitude = 32995 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: This case is similar to encounters 15 and 26. The crew
received a "descend to cross" command to avoid an intruder aircraft (FOG
26) which was climbing underneath the TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 41
seconds after the command was given. The maneuver resulted in an increase
in altitude separation and slant range (1221 FT, 188 FT) at CPA compared
to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude. The slant range at CPA
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in thiscasewas 5998 FT (.99NM).
SCENARIO #29- CREW #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 06:31:28; altitude = 3018 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -13.89 FPS or -833 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (21 FT, 13 FT)
at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -833 FPM.
SCENARIO #30 - CREW #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 01:35:13; altitude = 2064 FT; leveling at 2000 FT.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (348 FT, 68 FT)
at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude of 2000
FT.
SCENARIO #31 -CREW #4221:
CONDITIONS: time = 02:46:49; altitude == 5127 FT; descending; descent
rate = -12.88 FPS or -772 FPM; clearance --- "descend and maintain 5000
FT".
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend to cross" command, the
maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (501
FT, 38 FT) at CPA compared to continuing the descent at -772 FPM until
levelat 5000 FT.
SCENARIO #32 - CREW #4312:
CONDITIONS: time -- 02:12:24; altitude --- 5080 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (464 FT, 159
FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #33 -CREW #4312:
CONDITIONS: time = 03:47:28; altitude = 3954 FT; descending; descent
rate = -21.25 FPS or -1275 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command fol-
lowed by a "climb" command. The maneuver resulted in an increase in alti-
tude separation and slant range (1555 FT, 143 FT) at CPA compared to con-
tinuing the descent at -1245 FPM.
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SCENARIO#34- CREW #4312:
CONDITIONS: time -- 03:49:39; altitude = 2163 FT; descending; descent
rate = -12.67 FPS or -760 FPM; clearance -- "descend and maintain 2000
FT".
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" requiring no des-
cent greater than 0 FPM. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude
separation and slant range (158 FT, 51 FT) at CPA compared to continuing
the descent at -760 FPM until level at 2000 FT.
SCENARIO #35 - CREW #4312:
CONDITIONS: time = 07:07:53; altitude = 33008 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "climb" command to avoid an intruder
aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing below the TCAS aircraft. CPA
occurred nine seconds after the command was given. The maneuver resulted
in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (267 FT, 73 FT) at CPA
compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude. The slant range
at CPA in this case was 3858 FT (.60 NM).
SCENARIO #36- CREW #4422:
CONDITIONS: time = 04:23:00; altitude -- 33086 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: This scenario is similar to scenario 35. The crew received a
"climb" command to avoid an intruder aircraft (FOG 26) which was climbing
below the TCAS aircraft. CPA occurred 15 seconds after the command was
given. The maneuver resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant
range (495 FT, 88 FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the
assigned altitude. The slant range at CPA was 5266 FT (.86 NM).
SCENARIO #37 - CREW #4422:
CONDITIONS: time ffi 04:43:56; altitude ffi 12035 FT; descending; descent
rate -- -37.95 FPS or -2277 FPM.
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command
requiring no descent greater than 2000 FPM. The crew reacted by
significantly reducing their descent rate. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (400 FT, 253 FT) at CPA
compared to continuing the descent at -2277 FPM.
SCENARIO #38- CREW #4422:
CONDITIONS: time -- 04:49:10; altitude = 6998 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
111
resultedin an increasein altitude separation and slant range (311 FT, 284
FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
SCENARIO #39- CREW #4422:
CONDITIONS: time -- 07:10:44; altitude = 3905 FT; descending; descent
rate - -18.21 FPS or-1092 FPM. ::
NARRATIVE: The crew received an "adjust vertical speed" command which
required no descent greater than 500 FPM. The crew significantly reduced
their descent rate and even climbed slightly. The maneuver resulted in an
increase in altitude separation and slant range (536 FT, 55 FT) at CPA com-
pared to continuing the descent at -1092 FPM.
SCENARIO #40 - CREW #4422:
CONDITIONS: time -- 10:26:45; altitude = 4947 FT; level flight.
NARRATIVE: The crew received a "descend" command. The maneuver
resulted in an increase in altitude separation and slant range (471 FT, 129
FT) at CPA compared to maintaining level flight at the assigned altitude.
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CONCLUSIONS
The TCAS II system maneuver commands resulted in increasedvertical
separationsand slant range distancesbetween TCAS equipped aircraftand
conflictingaircraftfor 37 of the 40 encountersstudied. The threeencounters
(3, II, 23) which showed a decrease in verticalseparationand slant range
(missdistance)at the closestpointof approach (CPA) are unexpected results;
some characteristicsoftheseencountersare noted here.
All three had the following common characteristics: the conflicting aircraft
was climbing rapidly underneath the TCAS aircraft when the resolution alert
(RA) was issued; the TCAS aircraft was straight and level at approximately
33000 feet; and the resolution alert called for a "descend to cross" maneuver.
The time interval between the RA and CPA on all three encounters (5 secs,
17 secs, 15 secs) was shorter than the average time for the 40 cases (23 secs).
The slant ranges at CPA for these three cases were in excess of 9000 feet or
1.48 nautical miles (11458 FT, 9009 FT, 9075 FT). There were six other
encounters involving the same intruder aircraft in this study (7, 15, 26, 28,
35, 3G) which all showed increases in vertical separation and slant range at
CPA as a result of performing the recommended evasive maneuver. Three of
these six (7, 35, 3G) received "climb" commands from the TCAS system. The
other three encounters (15, 26, 28) received "descend to cross" commands
(similar to 3, 11, and 23); but, in these cases, the times from RA to CPA (26
secs, 24 secs, 41 secs) were longer than the average. Also, these three (15, 2G,
28) showed much shorter slant ranges at CPA (5559 FT, G629 FT, 5998 FT)
than the three encounters with decreased separation (3, 11, 23).
Further analysis of the three anomalous encounters indicated that TCAS
inaccurately predicted the time to CPA because of a large lateral miss dis-
tance. The TCAS II logic does not consider bearing information; the system
was therefore unaware that the lateral miss distance would be so large. In
none of these three encounters was closest separation less than 9000 ft hor-
izontally.
The results of this study also demonstrate that three encounters (1, 2, 9)
would have resulted in dangerous situations i£ the recommended TCAS
maneuver had not been performed. Without a TCAS maneuver, these three
conflicts would have resulted in slant ranges (miss distances) of less than 500
feet with altitude separations between the two aircraft of less than 300 feet.
It should be noted that no dangerous situations developed when the crews
used the TCAS system.
An analysis of the flight station video recordings indicates that the "adjust
vertical speed" voice command was confusing for some of the pilots. The ter-
minology of this command is ambiguous in that it does not specify an increase
or a decrease in climb or descent rate. Several Captains told the First OtTicer
at the controls to "level off_v when the resolution advisory display required
only a decrease in descent rate. An improvement in the wording of this com-
mand or a better presentation on the RA display may help to reduce the con-
fusion that was noted in this study.
Overall, the TCAS II system should result in a significant enhancement to the
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"see and avoid" procedures in the cockpit and dramatically improve the
safety of airline travel.
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Appendix R: USE OF THE TCAS TRAFFIC ADVISORY DISPLAY
FOR EVASIVE MANEUVERING
LCDR Robert J. Tuttell, USN
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
October, 1087
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INTRODUCTION
The TCAS II traffic advisory display is designed to be used by pilots to
aid them in establishing visual contact with conflicting traffic. It may also be
used to observe the flight paths of nearby traffic and monitor the
relative altitude differences between the TCAS aircraft and other aircraft in
the vicinity. This allows the pilots to see dangerous situations developing
and prepare for possible evasive maneuvering. Eight airline flight crews
participated in the NASA-Ames TCAS II study using systems which utilized
this display as well as the IVSI display. They were thoroughly briefed
that the traffic advisory display was for traffic information only and was not
to be used for evasive maneuvering. The IVSI display was to be used for
evasive maneuvers in the vertical plane following a resolution advisory. In
general, the pilots adhered to the guidelines that they were given. There
were fourteen incidents where the pilots used their own experience and judge-
ment to maneuver the aircraft based on the traffic advisory display informa-
tion. Each of these incidents will be examined in this report.
PROCEDURES
The use of the information obtained from the traffic advisory display for
maneuvering was investigated using information from three different sources.
(1) Computer printouts of the TCAS-equipped aircraft's data for all
occurrences of a heading change or bank angle greater than 10 degrees were
examined for the time period from two minutes before a traffic alert through
the end of the alert. Similar printouts for resolution alerts were investigated
using the same parameters. All incidents of altitude deviations of 100
feet or greater, or vertical velocity changes of greater than 500 feet per
minute, were also examined for the TCAS aircraft before and during the
traffic and resolution alert time periods.
(2) Two observers monitored the flight crew's actions during the simulator
testing. Both individuals filled out forms which contained the conditions for
each alert as well as comments from their personal observations. These
reports were a valuable source of data. Another source of information was
the corrective RA analysis forms completed during post-flight data reduction
(Appendix M).
(3) Cockpit video tapes were used to observe the flight crew's responses to
the traflSc advisory information and were used to confirm the incidents of
maneuvering based on this information.
All maneuvers which were based on visual sightings were not counted as
adjustments or improper use of the system, unless the evasive maneuvers used
traffic advisory information after visual contact was lost. Maneuvers based
on ATC clearances or navigation maneuvers also were not counted as adjust-
ments.
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RESULTS
Fourteen incidents of maneuvering ba._ed on information obtained from
the traffic advisory display are described. Each crew's incidents are
grouped together to show trends.
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CREW #3111: No incidents.
cREw #3221:2 altitude adjustments and 2 turns.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 07:51:00; visual contact, then lost visual con-
tact during maneuvering; twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descend-
ing.
NARRATIVE: Crew adjusted their descent rate during the approach in
response to a traffic advisory showing traffic beneath them. After clearing
the traffic they continued their approach.
(2) CONDITIONS: time = 09:06:49; no visual contact; twilight; visual
meteorological conditions; climbing.
NARRATIVE: Crew turned to the right to avoid a mode A aircraft after
takeoff during the climb. Aircraft that are mode A transponder equipped do
not have altitude reporting capability, and thus show up on the traffic
advisory display with no relative altitude information. Additionally, no
resolution alerts or recommended evasive maneuvers can be issued for
these types of aircraft. The crew discussed the incident and decided that the
turn was needed to ensure separation since they did not know what altitude
the other aircraft was flying at.
(3) CONDITIONS: time = 09:53:48; no visual contact; twilight_ visual
meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: Crew was descending to level at 5000 feet. After
evaluating the information on the traffic display, they leveled off slightly
above their assigned level off altitude and started a slight climb. A reso-
lution advisory calling for a climb was issued a few seconds after they
started to climb. After clearing the traffic, they descended to their assigned
altitude.
(4) CONDITIONS: time = 09:58:35; no visual contact; twilight; visual
meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: Crew turned right to clear mode A traffic on a localizer
approach using information obtained from the traffic advisory display.
After clearing the traffic they completed the approach.
CREW #3312: 1 altitudeadjustment.
(i) CONDITIONS: time = 07:47:33; no visual contact; night; visual
meteorological conditions; descending.
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NARRATIVE: During a descent, the crew responded to the information
on the traffic advisory display which showed an aircraft 1000 feet below
them. They decided to level the aircraft instead of continuing their des-
cent. This resulted in the crew having to notify ATC that they would not be
able to meet a crossing altitude clearance. After clearing the traffic they con-
tinued their descent.
CREW _3422:1 turn and 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time = 03:53:52; visual contact then lost visual con-
tact; night; visual meteorological conditions; level flight.
NARRATIVE: Crew had visual contact on a conflicting aircraft but
lost sight of it. The traffic advisory display showed the traffic at 12:30 and
climbing below them. A resolution alert advised the crew to "descend to
cross" in order to cross under the conflicting aircraft. The pilot in command
decided to descend as instructed and turn left slightly to increase the
separation distance. Visual contact was regained after the evasive
maneuver.
(2) CONDITIONS: time = 09:17:15; no visual contact; night; visual
meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach with multi-
ple aircraft in the area when they received a traffic advisory on an aircraft
climbing below their aircraft. The pilot in command anticipated the possibil-
ity of a collision and advanced the power on the engines to level off. As he
responded the TCAS system issued a resolution alert and gave the crew a
"climb" command. He followed the instructions, remained clear of the
other aircraft and finally resumed his approach.
CREW #4UI: 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time-- 02:27:24; visual contact after the maneuver;
twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach when they
received a traffic advisory and noticed that they were descending on top of
another aircraft. Using this information, they stopped their descent and
attempted to notify ATC of their situation. Visual contact was finally esta-
blished on the other aircraft and they maintained their altitude until the
other aircraft passed beneath them.
CREW #4221:3 altitude adjustments.
(1) CONDITIONS: time -- 04:35:50; no visual contact, twilight; visual
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meteorologicalconditions;descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was descending for an approach when the traffic
advisory displayed a conflicting aircraft at 1200. The crew evaluated the
range and altitude several times before deciding to level off while the aircraft
was still 4 miles away. They continued to evaluate the information that was
presented and decided that the aircraft was going the same way they were
and that they could "sneak under him". They continued their descent
behind the other aircraft and completed their approach. The crew never
received a resolution alert due to their maneuvering on the traffic advisory
display information.
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(2) CONDITIONS: time = 06:30:00; no visual contact; twilight; visual
meteorological conditions; level flight.
NARRATIVE: ATC clearedthe crew to descend. The crew hesitateddue
to trafficon the trafficadvisory display and asked ATC for a clearanceto
remain level.ATC reiteratedthat they were cleared to descend and the
crew complied by "descendingquickly" to stay clearof traffic.During the
descentthey receiveda resolutionalertcallingfora descent. This crew mon-
itoredthe trafficadvisory displayduring maneuvering and wanted to con-
tinue descending afterclearingtraffic.They decided not to aftera short dis-
cussionof theirATC clearance and terrainclearanceconsiderations.They
maintained theirassignedleveloffaltitudeuntilthey were clearofthe traffic.
(3) CONDITIONS: time = 06:33:40; visual contact then lost visual con-
tact; twilight; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: On a localizer approach, the crew had the traffic visually
then lost it. They were concerned with the other aircraft's position and
used the traffic advisory display's information to stay "a little higher" than
the other aircraft until they were clear. They adjusted their descent rate to
maintain vertical separation. One pilot from this crew stated "we are really
trusting an instrument a lot".
CREW _4312:1 turn.
(1) CONDITIONS: time ffi 01:25:24; no visual contact; night; visual
meteorological conditions; climbing.
NARRATIVE: The crew was climbing after takeoff. They responded
to a traffic advisory on the display by delaying a required turn until they were
clear of the traffic. The pilot did not begin the turn until the other pilot
informed him that they were past the traffic on the display.
CREW _4422:1 turn and 1 altitude adjustment.
(1) CONDITIONS: time -- 03:20:05; no visual contact; night; instrument
meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: While descending in the clouds, the crew responded
to a traffic advisory by turning "hard left" to avoid a mode A aircraft. The
pilot in command justified the turn by concluding that since TCAS
resolution alerts and evasive maneuvers are not available for mode A traffic
he had to maneuver to ensure safe separation. The other pilot responded
that the Other aircraft was probably in VMC conditions below the clouds.
After clearing the traffic the crew returned to course.
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(2) CONDITIONS: time = 10:26:30; visual contact after the maneuver;
night; visual meteorological conditions; descending.
NARRATIVE: The crew was cleared to descend to an assigned altitude.
Approaching the assigned altitude, the crew received a traffic alert showing
an aircraft 200 feet below them. They decided to level off and advanced
power on the engines. During the level off maneuver, a resolution alert
occurred calling for a descent. The crew complied with the command and
descended. During the descent they obtained visual contact as they passed
under the other aircraft.
CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of the fourteen incidents shows a few patterns. Altitude
adjustments accounted for 64% of the total adjustments (9 out of 14). The
majority of the adjustments occurred during descents (10 out of 14). Three
of the turn adjustments involved maneuvers to avoid a mode A transponder
equipped aircraft. The most common scenario involved the TCAS aircraft
descending on top of another aircraft. These situations gave the pilots
enough warning so that they could observe the dangerous situation
developing on the traffic advisory display and take corrective action. The
corrective action usually resulted in a decrease in the rate of descent or a level
off above the assigned altitude for a short period of time. All of the
fourteen adjustments caused small deviations from ATC clearances for
short time periods. Each crew attempted to notify ATC of the deviations
that were required as soon as workload permitted.
Pilot training programs will need to be implemented to standardize
the use of the TCAS lI system. The responsibility for safety of flight for an
aircraft rests with the pilot in command. The training must emphasize this
responsibility and allow him (or her) to use all the information available to
maintain a safe distance from other aircraft. Turns away from mode A
transponder equipped aircraft should be discouraged. The inaccuracy of the
bearing and altitude information from the traffic advisory display must be
emphasized. The possibility of degrading the performance of the TCAS
computer's evasive maneuver commands by maneuvering on the traffic
display should be discussed. Pilots must learn to use the system the way the
designers intended it to be used, but they also must remember to use their
training and experience to evaluate situations and take appropriate action to
ensure safety of flight.
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APPENDIX S: POST-FLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
Note: The average ratings provided by flight crews are shown
just above the scale accompanying each question; where
responses differed significantly across experimental conditions,
C2, C3 or C4 identifies the average of the responses for each
experimental group of four crews (12 crew members).
Numbers below multiple-choice questions identify the response
frequencies.
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Post-Flight Questionnaire for the NASA/FAA TCAS Human Factors Study
Now that you have this simulation we would like to get your evaluation
of the system and its use. Remember this research will provide input
to the ultimate design and implementation of the TCAS which will even-
tually be in your airplane. It is very important that you carefully
answer each question. Generally it is best to record the response
that first comes bo mind.
This questionnaire is meant to be a starting point for your evalua-
tion, don't limit your responses to these questions. Use the reverse
sides of the pages to expand and extrapolate from these issues.
Please mark the point on the scale best representing your evaluation
of the following items.
Crew Member: Capt F/O S/O
In comparing this simulation to typical line flights:
1 The cockpit procedures and duties in this simulation were:
very _ffi8.3
unrealistic
very
realistic
2 The air traffic control services in this simulation were:
very _=8.5
unrealistic
very
realistic
3 The aircraft response to manual control input was:
very _ffi6.7
unrealistic
very
realistic
4 The differences between the aircraft you fly and this simulator were:
very i=6.3 not at all
distracting distracting
How often were you aware of the location of known traffic?
t=7.3
never always
6 The information from ATC traffic advisories and seeing the aircraft out
of the window was:
often _---6.4 never
conflicting conflicting
7. Did you ever take evasive action to avoid another aircraft? yes no
43 2
8. What type of evasive maneuver do you prefer?
no preference climbs/descents turns
13 11 18
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g. What are your current procedures for ATC traffic advisories and
see-and-avoid?
10. What ways could the air traffic controller better help you to avoid near
mid air collisions?
i
11. Based upon your actual flight experience does a collision threat exist?
strongly _=7.4 strongly
disagree agree
questions Concerning the use of the TCAS:
12. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the operation
and limitations of TCAS is:
very _=7.0 very
limited complete
13. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the TCAS traffic
advisory is:
very _=7.1 very
limited c plete
14. For the purpose of operating TCAS, your understanding of the TCAS maneuver
advisory is:
very ;=7.0 very
limited complete
15. The training you received for TCAS use was:
very
inadequate
_=8.3 very
adequate
16. The operational procedures for TCAS use were:
very _:7.5 very
inappropriate appropriate
17. The addition of TCAS to the other flight duties was:
very C4=6.2 C2=7.9 C3=8.0
distracting
not at all
distracting
18. After several months of use in line service TCAS would be:
very R=7.1 not at all
distracting distracting
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zg. For reducing the risk of mid-air collisions, TCAS was:
not at all R=8.0
useful
very
useful
20. For aiding visual contact with the traffic, TCAS was:
not at all C2=4.3 C3=8.3 C4=9.3
useful
very
useful
21. Would TCAS affect the time you normally spend scanning for traffic?
increase _=4.6 decrease
scan time scan time
22. The information from ATC traffic advisories and the TCAS was:
often R=6.8 never
conflicting conflicting
23. Would TCAS increase or decrease contact with ATC?
greatly R=5.O
increase
greatly
decrease
24. In rare instances TCAS is unable to recommend a resolution (1Unable bo
CommandW), given this limitation, do you feel TCAS is an acceptable system
for reducing the risk of mid-air collisions?
very R=7.7 very
unacceptable acceptable
25. What did you do when this occured?
26. Was the aural alert and caution/warning light effective in getting your
attention? C3=8.2
very C4=7.2 C2=8.5 very
ineffective effective
27. Was the aural alert and caution/warning light distracting in their
function of getting your attention?
very C4=5.6 C2=7.8 C3=8.5 not at all
distracting distracting
28. In preparing for evasive maneuvers, the TCAS traffic advisory was:
not at all R=7.7 very
useful useful
29. In executing TCAS evasive maneuvers, the voice command was:
not at all R=7.6 very
useful useful
30. For communicating the recommended evasive action Or restriction to
vertical rate, the lights on the IVSI were:
difficult bo _--8.5 easy to
interpret interpret
31. The average time it took you to initiate the evasive maneuver, after the
TCAS warning, was 3.1 seconds.
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32. The evasive maneuvers as prescribed by TCAS were:
very _=7.7
unacceptable
very
acceptable
33. The IVSI indications of unsafe vertical rates (when evasive action was
not required) were:
not at all R=7.4 very
useful useful
34. Did you ever take evasive action without being told to by TCAS? yes
25
if so, did you do so based on visual contact with the traffic? yes no
22 2
35. Did you ever maneuver differently than TCAS instructed? yes no
6 28
36. If so, please explain
no
g
37. Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver that required you to
cross through another aircraft's altitude?
very C4=4.5 C2=5.4 C3--6.9 not st all
reluctant reluctant
38. Were you reluctant to perform a TeAS maneuver in conflict with your
ATC clearance?
very _--6.5 not at all
reluctant reluctant
3g. Would you be reluctant to maneuver in conflict with your ATC clearance if
the rules were changed so that TCAS evasive action was endorsed?
very _=8.6 not at all
reluctant reluctant
40. Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver in IMC?
C2=7.4
very C4--4.8 C3=7.5
reluctant
not at all
reluctant
41. Operation of TCAS in IMC and _ was:
very
different
_=7.2 not at all
different
Please explain:
42. Would you be satisfied with this TCAS system as a safety enhancement to
the airplane you fly?
greatly ;=7.6 greatly
dissatisfied satisfied
43. Were there instances where the TCAS did not perform as you expectad it to?
Please explain:
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44. Were inappropriate maneuvers prescribed? Please explain:
45. How often did you contact ATC regarding traffic conflicts identified by
TCAS?
_=2.5
always never
46. What changes would be appropriate in pilot and controller operating
procedures with the implementation of TCAS?
47. What is the feature you liked most about TCAS?
48. What is the feature you liked least about TCAS?
questions Concerning the Information on the Traffic Advisory Display:
49. In general, the traffic information was:
not at all
useful
_=g.o very
useful
50. The information on the display was:
not ay all
legible
_=7.8 very
legible
51. Znterpreting the information on the display was:
difficult to _--8.6
interpret
easy to
interpret
52. Were the different colors and symbol shapes of targets helpful in
recognizing threats?
not at all C4=8.3 very
helpful helpful
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52a. Were the different colors of targets helpful in recognizing threats?
not at all C3=7.2 very
helpful helpful
53. The number of targets on the display was:
too R=4.2
few
too
many
54. The maximum number of targets seen on the display at one time was? 3.5
55. Additional filtering of targets (either manual or automatic) would be:
very _=5.3 very
undesirable desirable
56. The 3 and 5 mile fixed range rings on the display were:
not at all C4=8.0 very
useful useful
56a. The 2 mile fixed range ring on the display was:
not at all ¢3=8.9
useful
very
useful
57. What value of fixed range rings would you substitute or add? 2.1
58. The horizontal/vertical range you generally used for departure and climb
was / , for cruise / ,
for descent / , for approach
59. Being able to vary the horizontal range for targeta to be displayed was:
not at all C4=6.8 very
useful useful
In what way?
59a.Being able to vary the horzontal range for targets to be displayed would be
not at all C3=6.2 very
useful useful
61. Being able to vary the vertical range for targets to be displayed was:
not at all C4=7.4 very
useful useful
In what way?
61a. Being able to vary the vertical range for targets to be displayed
would be:
not at all C3=6.5 very
useful useful
63. Would you prefer a system that automatically switched horizontal and
vertical ranges? yes no
4 19
64. The location of the display was:
very C4=5.2 C3=7.6 very
poor good
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64a. Pushing the traffic s.itch to display the 8 most important targets being
tracked by TCA$ was:
not at all C3=6.2 very
useful I l.n useful
64b. Could the triangle symbol at the other aircraft's location be omitted
and the data block adequately represent its location? yes no Cond 3
2 9 only
65. How often did you use the arrows to determine if traffic was climbing or
descending? R=8.4
never often
66. Did the traffic display ever cause you to expect a climb when TCAS told
you to descend, or vice versa? yes no
6 16
67. Please explain:
68. In executing evasive maneuvers, the symbol for the type of maneuver in
the upper left corner was:
not at all C4=3.3 very
useful useful
6g. The refresh rate of the displayed location of the traffic was:
very R=8.6 very
unacceptable acceptable
70. The location of the traffic as represent_l on the display differed from
what was observed out of the window:
_=8.0
often never
71. Would the traffic advisory display help prevent being startled
by the presence of the nearby aircraft on a parallel approach? yes no
2O 3
72. The addition of the traffic advisory display to the cockpit was:
very R=6.5 not at all
distracting I l l l___l l l l l l l distracting
73. Did the traffic advisory display provide confidence in the correctness of
the subsequent maneuver advisory? yes no
24
74. Do you feel the information on the traffic advisory display is accurate
enough to be used to maneuver your aircraft? yes no
2O 3
Please explain:
180
"I:11
75. Did you ever maneuver without being told to by TCAS based on the
information on the traffic advisory display? yes no
17 4
76. Were there features of the display that interfered with your use of the
TCAS? yes no
Please explain
77. Your understanding of the operation of the traffic advisory display is:
very _:=6.9 very
limited completa
78. The training you received on the traffic advisory display was:
very ;=8.2 very
inadequate adequate
79. Would you add any information to the traffic advisory display? yes no
If so what?
80. What information would you take off of the traffic advisory display?
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